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This study deals with the relationship between merit 
pay, organizational climate, and other variables in 
elementary schools. The research in this study involves 
eight research questions that fall into two categories. The 
first category, deals with faculty behavior and and elements 
of organizational climate attributable to faculty 
interactions. The second category, deals with elements of 
organizational climate attributable to principal behavior. 
The literature review focused on merit pay and the 
issues, both pro and con, that continue to make incentive 
pay systems a controversial topic in education. Also 
reviewed, is the literature dealing with the organizational 
climate of schools, as well as the literature dealing with 
climate related issues. 
The methodology for this study involved the 
collection of data using the Organizational Climate 
Description Questionnaire - RE and a demographic response 
form. Sixty-six teachers from four Du Page County, Illinois 
elementary schools responded to both research tools. Two of 
the schools were from merit pay elementary districts, the 
other two schools were from non-merit pay school districts. 
A t test was performed to test the differences between 
groups and to aid in answering the research questions. 
In the area of faculty relations, the research 
indicated that the two merit pay schools had slightly more 
open climates than did the two non-merit pay schools. 
significant differences in collegiality were found to exist 
between teachers with 0-5 years of experience and those with 
20 plus years of experience. The more senior teachers being 
more collegial. The non-merit pay schools were found to 
have more engaged faculty members. The merit pay schools 
were found to have a significantly more intimate 
organizational climate. 
In the area of principal behavior, the non-merit pay 
schools had principals who were more open than their merit 
pay counterparts. As a group, the merit pay schools had 
stronger directive scores. Stronger supportive qualities 
were found to exist in the two non-merit pay schools. 
Teachers with more than 20 years of experience perceived 
more support from principals than did teachers with 0-5 
years of experience. Restrictive behavior scores were 
strongest in the merit pay schools when schools were srouped 
by type. A significant difference in scores for 
restrictiveness existed between union and non-union 
teachers. 
Included in this study are implications for use of 
the information gleaned from the study, as well as 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
The decade of the 1980's has seen strident efforts 
undertaken towards reforming the structure of 
education. At the heart of these reform efforts has 
been the search for excellence. Included in that 
search for excellence has been the overwhelming feeling 
that with an improvement in the quality of teaching 
afforded America's students, a corresponding increase 
in the quantity and quality of student learning will be 
brought about. What fueled this belief held by so many 
Americans? A spate of national reports dealing with 
education reform were published beginning in 1983. The 
premier document entitled A Nation At Risk1 was 
released to the American public in April, 1983. The 
report was the end result of the work of the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education appointed in 
August, 1981 by then Secretary of Education 
1National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
A Nation At Risk (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1983). 
2 
Terrell Bell. Among the Commission's recommendations 
was, "Salaries for the teaching profession should be · 
professionally competitive, market sensitive, and 
performance based. 112 
Led by the power and prestige of the federal 
government and the chief administrative officer of 
government, President Ronald Reagan, the debate over 
merit pay began. While the President and other figures 
in and out of government and/or education became 
proponents of merit pay programs, the opponents of such 
plans were not difficult to ferret out. Both the 
National Education Association, the nation's largest 
teachers union, and the American Federation of Teachers 
early in the decade came out squarely against merit 
pay. 
Historically, merit pay is in essence the first 
form of teacher compensation. The images of Ichabod 
Crane or the school marm of the old west, are of 
teachers who were paid for the quality of their 
instruction, based upon the perception of the town 
elders. However, America in the twentieth century is a 
2 Ibid, as reported in, The Excellence 
Report-Using It to Improve Your Schools, (Washington, 
D.C.: American Association of School Administrators), 
p. 11. 
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vastly different place, as are its schools. No longer 
do the townspeople decide if, for whatever reasons, 
faculty members retain their positions or receive a 
salary increase. 
In September of 1983, the Phi Delta Kappan3 
published its annual Gallup Poll Survey of the public's 
attitudes towards education. In that issue, the Poll 
revealed that the general populace favored merit pay 
for teachers by a margin of two-to-one (61% to 31%). 
In a similar poll taken in 1970, 58% of those polled 
felt that teachers should be paid on the basis of 
merit. Significantly, when those who were familiar 
with the President's Commission report were asked about 
their opinion of paying teachers on the basis of merit, 
71% favored the idea as opposed to 25% who did not 
favor merit pay. 
Once again in 1984 the Phi Delta Kappan4 sought 
the public's view of merit pay. For the total 
3Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Nationwide Poll," Phi 
Delta Kappan, (September, 1983), p. 45. 
4Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Annual Poll," Phi Delta 
Kappan (September, 1984), p. 34. 
4 
sample of those polled, 65% of respondents favored 
merit pay, while 22% opposed, and 13% had no opinion.· 
However, when confined to those individuals who were 
aware of merit pay proposals, 76% favored paying 
teachers on merit, while 19% of the respondents opposed 
the idea, and 5% had no opinion. It could be said, 
that generally the public favored paying teachers on 
the basis of merit. 
A month after publishing its annual poll of the 
public's attitude toward education in 1984, the Phi 
Delta Kappan5 published the results of a Gallup Poll of 
the nation's teachers. Merit pay questions of 
differing varieties were asked in that survey. Not 
surprisingly, America's teachers were not enamoured 
with the idea of merit pay. Sixty-four percent of 
teachers opposed merit pay, 32% endorsed the idea and 
another 4% had no opinion. Chief among the reasons for 
opposing merit pay was the idea that it would be 
difficult to give a fair evaluation (23%). Also cited, 
was the fact that merit pay would create morale 
problems (15%)~ administrators can't evaluate fairly 
(12%), and teaching can't be objectively measured 
(12%). Of those who supported merit pay, 25% favored 
5Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Annual Teacher's Poll," 
Phi Delta Kappan, (October, 1984), p.103. 
5 
the idea because they felt that through merit pay good 
teachers would be rewarded. Only one per cent of a11· 
teachers queried felt that children would benefit as a 
result of teachers being paid through a merit pay 
program. 
When asked whether or not teachers felt that 
their colleagues were deserving of merit pay despite 
their feelings towards such plans, 76% of all teachers 
felt that, indeed teachers in their schools deserved 
such a reward. Sixteen per cent of those responding to 
the survey felt that no teacher in their school 
warranted merit pay, and eight per cent of the teacher 
respondents had no opinion. When asked what percentage 
of teachers deserved merit pay, those teachers who 
favor such plans responded that, on average, 33% of all 
teachers deserved merit pay. The range of responses 
however, showed that 13% of teachers felt that under 
10% of teachers warranted merit salaries, 23% of 
teachers felt 10% to 19% of teachers deserved merit 
pay~ 17% of teachers were of the opinion that 20% to 
29% of teachers warranted merit pay~ another 23% felt 
30% to 59% of all teachers performed meritoriously~ and 
17% of teacher respondents agreed tht 60% to 98% of all 
teachers warranted merit salary increases. 
Who should determine merit pay? According to 
the October, 1984 Gallup Poll, 63% of U.S. teachers 
6 
felt that a committee of teachers should make that 
determination. The next most frequent response was the 
school principal (59%), followed by a committee of 
outside educators (42%). The poll showed that only 20% 
of the teacher respondents felt that parents or 
students should be involved in that decision. The 
Gallup Poll of 1984 showed a dramatic difference of 
opinion on merit pay between teachers and the consumer 
public. By a four to one margin the public favored 
teacher merit pay. Sixty-eight per cent of the public 
held the opinion that academic achievement or the 
improvement of student performance, measured by 
standardized tests, should be the single criteria used 
to determine merit. Only 39% of American teachers 
agreed with that viewpoint. Sixty-six per cent of 
teachers felt that their colleagues should determine 
merit, only 48% of the American public agreed with that 
viewpoint. 
In summation the September, 1984 Gallup Poll of 
the American public and the October, 1984 Gallup Poll 
of American teachers showed some widely disparate views 
of merit pay. Thirty-two per cent of American teachers 
favored merit pay, while 76% of the public saw such 
plans as favorable. Sixty-four per cent of teachers 
opposed merit pay, only 19% of the American public 
agreed with them. When it came to criteria for 
7 
determining merit, the single largest gap between 
teacher opinions and those of the U.S. public was 
apparent in the area of academic achievement or 
improvement of students as measured by standardized 
tests. Thirty-nine per cent of teacher respondents 
felt that student achievement was a valid criteria for 
determining merit. Sixty-eight per cent of the 
American public agreed with them. The second largest 
gap came in the area of peer evaluation, wherein 66% of 
teachers felt that to be a valid measurement of merit. 
On the other hand, 48% of the American public agreed 
with that view. 
The seventeenth Annual Gallup Poll results were 
published in the September, 1985 Phi Delta Kappan6 • In 
that issue the Poll showed that six of ten Americans 
continued to favor merit pay for teachers, about the 
same numbers as the 1984 Poll. Specifically, 60% of 
Americans favored merit pay, 24% opposed the idea and 
16% had no opinion. For the most part, it is clear 
that while most Americans favor merit pay for teachers, 
those who do the teaching in the nation's 
6 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Seventeenth Annual Poll," 
Phi Delta Kappan, (September, 1985), p.39. 
8 
schools hold the opposite view, thereby reflecting the 
official positions of the two major teacher's unions in 
the United States, the National Education Association 
and the American Federation of Teachers. Both 
organizations have historically opposed the notion of 
merit pay for the country's teachers, with the NEA 
taking the most vociferous anti-merit pay stance. 
In the context of education, organizational 
climate may be viewed as a school's personality. There 
has not been a great deal of study in the area of 
organizational climate of schools. The first work was 
that of Andrew W. Halpin and Don B. Croft whose 
research7 in this area was published in 1962. In more 
recent times, the work of Wayne K. Hoy of Rutgers 
University in the area of organizational climate has 
led to the development of a more contemporary version 
of Halpin and Croft's, Organizational Climate 
Description Questionnaire. Hoy's work8 , published in 
1986, is the basis of the development of his 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE 
7A.W. Halpin and D.B. Croft, The Organizational 
Climate of Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of 
Education, August, 1962). 
8 Wayne K. Hoy and Sharon I.R. Clover, 
"Elementary School Climate: A Revision of the OCDQ," 
Education Administration Quarterly, XXII, No.!, 
(Winter, 1986), pp.93-110. 
9 
(Revised, Elementary). While not viewed in much the 
same way as Halpin and Croft's work and that of Hoy, 
others have dealt with the issues surrounding and 
involving organizational climate. Various works and 
treatises, to be reviewed in Chaper Two of this 
dissertation will deal in detail with these works. 
What is important however, is the major focus of this 
research study. Primarily, this study hoped to 
determine if any differences exist in the 
organizational climates of merit pay schools as opposed 
to non-merit pay schools. A major component of 
organizational climate is staff morale. As reported 
earlier, the October, 1984 Phi Delta Kappan9 reported 
that 12% of the nation's teachers were opposed to merit 
pay because they felt such programs would create morale 
problems in schools. A part of this study dealt with 
such issues as staff morale in both merit pay and 
non-merit pay schools. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to 
determine if significant differences exist in the 
school climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools. 
The procedures utilized in this study attempted to seek 
9Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Teacher's Poll," Phi 
Delta Kappan, (October, 1984), p. 103. 
10 
answers to a series of research questions. Among these 
research questions, which are based on the 
sub-categories of the OCDQ-RE, were the following: 
1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay 
schools less open than that of non-merit pay 
schools? 
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less 
open than principals in non-merit pay 
schools? 
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more 
, collegial than teachers in merit pay 
schools? 
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more 
directive that those in non-merit pay 
schools? 
5. Are principals in merit pay schools less 
supportive than those in non-merit pay 
schools? 
6. Are principals in merit pay schools more 
restrictive than non-merit pay principals? 
7. Are teachers in merit pay schools more 
disengaged than non-merit pay teachers? 
8. Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit 
more intimate behavior than teachers in 
non-merit pay schools? 
Clearly, school climate is a result of the 
relationships that teachers experience with their 
colleagues and their principals. These day to day 
relationships help to form the school's personality and 
set the tone of the school. Because merit pay may be 
seen as a method of rewarding some more than others, 
based upon the perceptions of the school principal, do 
such plans have an impact in forming the school's 
organizational climate? Do merit pay programs have an 
impact upon the relationships that teachers have with 
one another and with their principal, who is charged 
with the improvement of instruction? 
11 
In addition to a study of school climate in a 
sample of merit pay and non-merit pay schools, this 
study also reviewed literature dealing with merit pay 
and organizational climate. Through a review of 
literature, a definition of merit pay and other terms 
will be established for use in this study. While 
organizational climate has not been the sole focus of 
major treatises in education, a number of relatively 
recent works that deal with collegiality, teaching 
conditions, teacher/principal relations and other 
school climate-like issues will be reviewed in Chapter 
Two of this dissertation. 
Also covered in this dissertation will be the 
methodology used in gathering data. A discussion of 
the instruments used as well as the processing and 
statistical analysis of data will be discussed in 
Chapter Three. Presentation of the data gathered for 
this dissertation will be made in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Five of this dissertation will focus on 
a summary of the collected data. This chapter will 
also include the findings and conclusions of the 
researcher in addition to recommendations for further 
study dealing with the issues of the organizational 
climate of schools and/or performance-based salary 
systems. 
12 
CHAPTER II 
Review of Literature 
The related literature is replete with articles, 
surveys, a limited number of unpublished dissertations, 
opinion papers and government documents that deal with 
the topic of merit pay. There is also evidence of 
related literature, albeit somewhat limited when 
compared to merit pay, that deals with organizational 
climate. However, this researcher could not locate 
related literature that deals with the dual study of 
the impact merit pay may or may not have on the 
organizational climate of elementary schools. 
Therefore, this chapter will deal with some of the 
related literature of merit pay, as well as that of 
organizational climate of schools, and, at the same, 
time attempt to develop a perspective as to how the two 
topics may affect one another as forces operating 
within the elementary school setting. 
Merit pay became a major issue in contemporary 
American education with the publication and release of 
the National Commission of Excellence in Education's 
report, A Nation At Risk10 in April, 1983. The opening 
10 . 1 . . E 11 . Nat1ona Comm1ss1on on xce ence in 
Education, A Nation at Risk (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1983). 
paragraph of that now famous report warned that, 
" ••• the educational foundations of our society are 
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity 
that threatens our very future as a Nation and a 
1 ull peep e. The report also went on to state 
that," ••• we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of 
14 
our educational system for the benefit of all-- old and 
young alike, affluent and poor, majority and 
' 't 1112 AN t' At R' k th d d t m1nor1 y. a ion is en procee e o map out 
a series of recommendations for five aspects of 
American education: A. Content B. Standards and 
Expectations C. Time D. Teaching E. Leadership 
and Fiscal. Recommendation D. Teaching, consisted of 
seven parts. Part two of that recommendation simply 
stated, 
Salaries for the teaching profession should be 
increased and should be professionally competitive, 
market-sensitive and performance-based. Salary, 
promotion, tenure and retention decisions should be 
tied to an effective evaluation system that 
includes peer review so that superior teachers can 
be rewarded, average ones enco~3aged, and poor ones 
either improved or terminated. 
11 Ibid., as reported in, The Excellence Report -
Using It to Improve Your Schools, (Washington, D.C.: 
American Association of School Administrators), p. 3. 
12Ibid. p. 3. 
13 Ibid. p. 11. 
15 
Certainly, the most controversial issue relating 
to teachers in A Nation At Risk was over the renewed 
call for merit pay. That aspect of the report alone 
consumed a great deal of national interest and fueled a 
new national debate. Teacher's unions, most notably 
the National Education Association, the country's 
largest, did not look favorably upon merit pay. 
However, those in state and federal governments as well 
as such organizations as the National School Boards 
Association took positions supporting the notion of 
merit pay. Five months after the release of A Nation 
at Risk, the National School Boards Association's, The 
American School Board Journal, published the results of 
their nationwide poll. Entitled, "Our nationwide poll: 
most teachers endorse the merit pay concept," 14 the 
article reported that nearly two-thirds of America's 
teachers (62.7%) favored merit pay. The survey was 
taken of a randomly selected sample of 7300 teachers 
across the United States in May, 1983. Of the 7300 
teachers surveyed 1261 were tabulated. To determine 
teacher favorability towards merit pay, those surveyed 
were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, 
14Marilee c. Rist, "Our nationwide poll: Most 
teachers endorse the merit pay concept," American 
School Board Journal, Vol. CLXX, No. 9 (September, 
1983), p.23. 
16 
"Teachers who are more effective in the classroom 
should receive larger salary increases than teachers 
who are less effective." The survey revealed that 
61.5% of National Education Association members favored 
merit pay, as did 62.1% of American Federation of 
Teachers members while 76.4% of non-union teachers also 
supported merit pay. The Journal article claimed to be 
the only survey ever to ask teachers what they felt 
about merit pay. Proportional numbers of responses 
were received of teachers nationally in such categories 
as sex, tenure status, school level, marital status, 
union membership and community setting. The definition 
used as a basis for merit pay was, "merit pay is a 
monetary stipend or salary increase paid for superior 
performance, as determined by a classroom performance 
evaluation. 1115 
The American School Board Journal also asked 
teachers who they felt should determine merit. 
Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents made the 
principal their first choice. The rankings after the 
principal were as follows: teacher peers 25.4%: 
department heads 15%: a combination of administrators 
and teachers 12.1%: curriculum specialist 5.5%: others 
3%. Teachers were also asked to check how merit salary 
15
rbid. p.23. 
17 
increases should be determined. Choices given were: 
1) by classroom effectiveness alone, 2) by seniority/· 
academic credits alone, 3) by a combination of factors 
one and two with greater weight given to 
seniority/academic credits, and 5) by a combination 
weighting each factor equally. 
Forty-one per cent of the teacher respondents to 
the Journal survey felt that classroom effectiveness 
coupled with seniority/academic credits equally 
weighted should be used to determine merit pay salary 
increases. A total of 26.8% of respondents believed 
that both factors should be considered, with greater 
weight given to effectiveness. The traditional union 
stance, that the sole criteria should be seniority, was 
supported by 17.6%. An additional 11.5% favored both 
performance and seniority with greater weight placed 
upon seniority and credits. Startlingly, only 3.1% of 
the respondents felt that classroom performance should 
be the sole criteria for determining merit. Such a 
plan, the Journal warned its readers, would pit the 
teachers against school board members. 
The National School Boards Association study had 
other revealing facts about merit pay. Younger 
teachers were more apt to favor merit pay than older 
teachers. The study showed that 85.3% of those who 
have taught less than three years favored merit pay, 
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while 59.1% of those who have taught longer than 
fifteen years gave a favorable rating to the idea. 
Non-tenured teachers also tend to agree with the 
concept of merit pay more than tenured teachers. 
Although both agree with the idea of performance-based 
pay, 70.2% of non-tenured teachers favor merit pay 
while 61.2% of their tenured colleagues agreed with 
them. Male teachers (66.3%) favored merit pay more 
than female teachers (59.9%). The study also revealed 
that married teachers (64.1%) approved of merit pay 
while 56.6 of divorced teachers and 52.2% of widowed 
teachers supported the merit pay concept. 
The NSBA research also showed that elementary 
school teachers (55.3%) favored merit pay the least. 
Middle school teachers (64.7%) followed, with junior 
high teachers (65.7%) and high school teachers (69.2%) 
favoring performance based salary programs. Community 
type had the slightest difference of opinion. The 
study revealed that 59.4% of urban teachers supported 
merit pay~ 63.7% of suburban teachers agreed with them 
and 64% of rural teachers agreed with the idea of merit 
pay. 
Although a plurality of thirty-nine per cent of 
teachers said that principals should be responsible for 
evaluation, some differences of opinion based upon 
school type and union membership was evidenced in the 
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National School Board's Association survey. Non-union 
members (52%) chose the principal as the prime 
evaluator more often than NEA members (39.2%) and AFT 
members (39.1%). Union members tend to favor their 
peers as the prime evaluators. The survey revealed 
that 25.4% of the NEA members and 27.5% of the AFT 
members preferred peer review as the method of 
evaluation for determing merit pay. 
Elementary school teachers (59.3%) favored the 
principal as primary the evaluator of classroom 
performance. Their colleagues at other levels of 
schooling agreed with them as follows: middle school 
teachers (38.9%), junior high school teachers (28.8%), 
and high school teachers (21.4%). If not the 
principal, then who should determine the level of 
classroom performance? Twenty-two per cent of teachers 
at the middle school level chose their peers, another 
16.3% of their middle school colleagues chose 
department heads. Of the junior high school teachers 
responding to the survey, 28.8% felt that their peers 
should be the prime evaluators, while 21.2% of their 
fellow teachers felt that their department heads should 
be the prime evaluator. Thirty-one percent of high 
school teachers favored peer evaluation, while another 
28.1% of their colleagues chose their department heads 
as the primary evaluator of classroom performance. 
The National School Boards Association survey 
clearly demonstrated that teachers were at least open 
to the idea of making salary increases at least 
partially contingent upon the level of classroom 
performance. 
In the Summer, 1984 issue of Planning and 
Changing, 16 Gail Thierbach Schneider, reports on her 
attitudinal study of 126 school board members, 435 
administrators, and 381 teachers. Schneider's study 
was completed as a follow-up to the National School 
Boards Association merit pay study. The intent of 
Schneider's work was to identify levels of agreement 
between school board members, administrators and 
teachers on merit pay, and whether or not significant 
areas of disagreement existed between the groups. 
Schneider's research found that considerable 
disagreement existed among the three groups on all 
aspects of merit pay. School board members tended to 
be in greater agreement than both administrators and 
teachers that merit pay would improve the quality of 
education, identify ineffective teachers and increase 
16Gail Thierbach Schneider,"Schools and Merit: 
20 
An Empirical Study of Attitudes of School Board 
Members, Administrators and Teachers Toward Merit 
Systems," Planning and Changing, Vol. XV (Summer, 1984) 
p. 89. 
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community support for education. Teachers 
overwhelmingly disagreed and administrators only 
marginally agreed with those issuses. Schneider points 
out that in view of the fact that the implementation 
and success of any merit pay plan would depend upon 
administrator and teacher support, careful 
consideration should be given to to the findings of her 
research before any merit plan is initiated. Also of 
concern is, given the opinions revealed in this study, 
that the time, effort, and additional money needed to 
implement a merit pay system would raise questions of 
the value of such a program. Schneider's secondary 
concern is whether or not an evaluation process can be 
identified that will be perceived as valid and reliable 
in making objective merit decisions. 
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett17 found several 
concerns about the implementation of merit pay plans in 
their survey of approximately 200 teachers. Chief 
among those were: 1.) Creation of morale problems. 
2.) Prejudices, biases, and personality conflicts will 
enter into merit decisions. 3.) Student class 
assignments will become problematic, with parents 
17 . d . '11 Charlie Q. Coffman an Pr1sc1 a 
Manarino-Leggett, "What Do Teachers Think of Merit Pay? 
Study Lists Important Variables," NASSP Bulletin, Vol. 
LXVIII (November, 1984) p. 54. 
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asking that their children be assigned to the most 
meritorious teachers. 
merit will receive it. 
4.) Not all teachers who deserve 
5.) Teacher patronage of 
administrators who make merit decisions. 
Reasons advanced in support of merit pay in the 
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett study were: 1.) Improved 
and better performance. 2.) Reward for excellence. 
3.) Motivation for good teaching and elimination of bad 
teachers. 4.) Increase in the quality of teaching. 
5.) Reward for those who make extra efforts. 
In addition to expressing past objections to 
performance-based salary systems, such as a lack of 
cooperation in districts that focus on merit, and 
humiliation of those teachers who are non-recipients, 
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett reported that almost all 
of their survey respondents expressed concern about the 
lack of ability of those assigned the task of 
assessment, to make fair and adequate performance 
appraisals for merit pay purposes. 
An analysis of the Coffman, Manarino-Leggett 
study revealed that those with a masters degree favored 
merit pay more than those with a bachelors degree. 
Those with more experience in teaching looked less 
favorably upon merit pay. Although age had no apparent 
affect upon responses, males were against merit pay by 
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a three to one ratio, while females vetoed the concept 
by a two to one margin. 
On June 17, 1983 Carl Perkins, Chairman of the 
Education and Labor Committee of the United States 
House of Representatives, appointed a task force on 
merit pay. The task force, both independent and 
bi-partisan, consisted of twenty-one members, seventeen 
from the private sector. The charge to the group was 
to study the issue of merit pay and to develop and 
report on merit programs in education. 
The Merit Pay Task Force heard witnesses from 
three major commissions that had recently issued 
educational reports dealing with reform. Governors, 
state legislators, deans of schools of education, 
students, teachers, principals and school board members 
also provided testimony. The Task Force also reviewed 
existing and proposed systems of performance-based 
salary systems. The group recognized that two forms of 
programs existed that recognized exemplary performance. 
Merit pay was defined by the Task force as a system 
that, "attempts to base salary on performance. 1118 
18committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House 
of Representatives, "Merit Pay Task Force Report," U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 5. 
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The Task Force also made note of the fact that, "Under 
merit pay there often is no sustained pay increase, 
although teachers may be eligible every year. 1119 
The career ladder system was also recognized by 
the Task Force as a system of rewarding teachers for 
exemplary performance. Career ladder systems, "create 
tiers from entry level through master teacher with 
varying pay and responsibilities at each level. 1120 The 
Task Force then set out to describe such a plan by 
outlining the responsibilities, requirements and 
remuneration accorded teachers at various levels 
described as: Apprentice Teacher, Professional Teacher, 
Senior Teacher and Master Teacher. 
In making its recommendation, the Merit Pay Task 
Force clearly questioned the efficacy of merit pay when 
it warned that, "Those who view merit pay as some easy, 
inexpensive, painless method of solving the nation's 
education problems are not realistic. 1121 Instead, merit 
pay was seen as a part of a puzzle in an effort to 
elevate the level of esteem and public perceptions of 
the teaching profession. The Task Force did not 
19Ibid. p.S. 
20 Ibid. p.S. 
21 Ibid. p.6. 
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confine itself solely to recommendations about merit 
pay. It recognized that the salary levels of teaching, 
in addition to its public esteem, needed improvement. 
However, it did make five distinct features to be 
included in what the group called experiments in 
performance-based pay. Some of these features included 
involvement of teachers, administrators and the 
community in the establishment of benefits and criteria 
of merit plans. The Task Force also warned of the 
potential abuse of merit systems that reward teachers 
for other than outstanding performance. Incentives 
should be established so that teacher self-improvement 
would be continued. Once established, the group called 
for continued upgrade and improvement of merit systems. 
Finally, the Task Force stressed that, in most systems, 
a potential danger existed if a school district failed 
to recognize teachers who failed to fall into the 
superior category. These teachers were referred to in 
the Task Force rei;fort as the, "lifeblood of the school 
system. 1122 
In 1983 the American Association of School 
Administrators published, Some Points to Consider When 
22 Ibid. p.7. 
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. M 't p 23 . you Discuss eri ay. In attempting to define 
what merit pay is, the AASA document found it easier· 
to define what merit pay is not. The booklet stressed 
that first and foremost merit pay is not a costcutting 
measure. The AASA also noted that salary increases in 
merit pay systems should not be withheld from teachers 
to penalize less than exemplary teaching. 
The AASA publication also reviewed why merit pay 
programs have failed. Citing teacher opposition as a 
major cause of the failure of merit pay, the booklet 
stated that, "Teachers have also contended that merit 
pay lowers morale.•• 24 Other reasons for the failure of 
merit pay cited by the AASA were: inadequate financing, 
difficulty in administering merit pay plans, 
insufficiently prepared evaluators and, inconsistency 
among evaluators. Unilateral evaluations and quota 
systems that create artificial cutoffs eliminating less 
experienced teachers from receivi~g merit increases 
23American Association of School Administrators, 
Some Points to Consider When You Discuss Merit Pay 
(Arlington, VA: American Association of School 
Administrators, 1983). 
24Ibid. p.16. 
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and the expense of such systems were also cited. 
In recognizing that the reason merit pay is supported 
is out of a perceived need to improve instruction, the 
AASA publication points out that schools can no longer 
attract the "best and the brightest" to the ranks of 
teaching. The Association also establishes in the 
booklet seven steps to include in the design of merit 
pay programs. They include: 1.) Involve the right 
people. 2.) Conduct the right research. 3.) Decide what 
you want. 4.) Design a program that gives you what you 
want. 5.) Document the program. 6.) Put your plan in 
action. 7.)Find out if the program is working: refine 
't 25 1 • 
Finally, stressing that improved productivity is 
the key element in assessing a merit pay program, AASA 
defines productivity as: 
Producing more knowledge (content) at agreed-on 
levels of quality. Producing more skills. 
Providing education for more students. Improving 
conditions that lead to more funds or more eff25tive 
use of existing funds for effective education. 
Keeping the productivity element foremost, AASA lists 
possible elements of a teacher plan for increasing 
productivity above standard performance. Included in 
25 Ibid. p.36. 
26 Ibid. p.36. 
those elements are goals and objectives, action plan, 
results expected, method of measurement, method of 
verification, measurement and additional 
t . 27 compensa ion. 
In 1984, the Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development published, Incentives for 
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Excellence In America's Schools. 28 A report of ASCD's 
Task Force on merit pay and career ladders, the 
publication was aimed at assisting the Association's 
members in understanding the issues surrounding merit 
pay and career ladders. What the report clearly stated 
in its very beginning was, 
Another very important goal is to place the issue of 
merit pay in the broader context of human resource 
development because comprehensive changes that 
promote effective management of schools and 
professional growth of teachers will prove more 
likely to positively influence teaching perform~~ce 
than any merit pay programs that might succeed. 
The ASCD Task Force made a concerted effort in its 
Report to make a reasoned, careful analysis of the 
27 Ibid. p.38. 
28 . . f s . . d c . 1 Association or uperv1s1on an urr1cu um 
Development, Incentives for Excellence in America's 
Schools, A report from the ASCD Task Force on Merit 
Pay and Career Ladders (Alexandria, VA: Association 
for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1984). 
29 Ibid. p.l. 
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sometimes emotionally charged issues of merit pay and 
career ladders. In laying forth the issues surrounding 
merit pay, the ASCD publication first dealt with the 
public perceptions about teaching. The Task Force 
identified six popularly held public perceptions: 
1. Teaching is an unsophisticated and relatively 
simple job. 
2. Since teaching is simple, evaluation of teaching 
must be simple. 
3. The public schools are staffed by lazy (and/or 
incompetent) teachers. 
4. Money will motivate highly qualified people to 
select teaching and persuade them to stay in 
teaching once there. 
5. The teaching profession cannot attract and hold 
first-rate personnel because it lacks 
performance-based financial incentives. 
6. Merit pay ~a linked to raising standards in 
education. 
The ASCD Task Force delves into the public 
perceptions of teaching and attempts to refute, while 
at the same time establish, a basis for the public 
views. The Task Force Report explains that while many 
in the general public may see teaching difficult at 
times, those same individuals do not see teaching as 
very complicated. The Task Force does, however, see 
the process as a complex act and the school room as the 
rightful place of the professional. The group also 
30
rbid. pp.3-6. 
30 
points out that the reason evaluation is seen as simple 
is that most of the public knows who the good teachers 
are. They acknowledge that a whole host of evaluation 
problems exist with teaching and to simply 
use pupil test scores on standardized tests is not a 
wise or valid method for determining teacher 
competence. 
Simply stated, ASCD found no evidence to support 
the public belief that public school teachers are 
incompetent and/or lazy. The Association also took 
exception to the sometimes duplicitous view the public 
takes about money and teaching. The public wants 
teachers who select the profession not for the money, 
but the calling, as in the ministry. Parents might be 
suspicious of those who entered teaching for financial 
reasons. However, the same individuals who want 
dedicated professionals working with their children 
reason that teachers would do a more effective job and 
would not leave the profession if paid a little more 
money. The Task Force saw no relationship between 
money and improved performance. 
Two reasons were cited by the ASCD group as to 
why the profession cannot attract and hold the best and 
the brightest to the profession. The first was an end 
to sex discrimination. Professions previously closed 
to women are now attracting women in large numbers. 
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Teaching and nursing, two roles formerly thought to be 
the only professional choice for women, consequently 
lose a capable pool of bright, able individuals. 
secondly, the group saw the fact that teacher's 
salaries were grossly lower than those in private 
industry as a reason why the more talented were not 
attracted to teaching. ASCD therefore proposes that 
base salaries for teaching be raised and, at the same 
time, questions whether or not the public would be 
willing to pay bonuses of $20,000 or more to keep good 
teachers from fleeing to the private sector in efforts 
to match the earning potential they would find in 
private industry. 
Finally, the ASCD group points out that the link 
between merit pay and higher standards is an absurdity. 
In discussing that link, they point out that merit may 
be seen by some to be a solution in itself. To now 
recognize those who all along have been doing the same 
quality work as suddenly meritorious indicates that the 
performance has improved. 
In planning for merit pay systems, the ASCD 
Report suggests that three groups of questions about 
merit pay need to be addressed. These include 
questions about goals and planning, design and 
implementation, and context and choices. The first 
group of questions deals with solutions to problems 
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that merit pay may resolve, how different 
constituencies feel about merit pay and short and long 
term results. The second group of questions deals with' 
differentiated pay allocation, the evaluation process, 
evaluators, access to higher paying positions, demotion 
and continued support from proponents of merit pay. 
Critical to questions of context and choices is the 
question of an adequate assessment of costs and the 
question of continued financial support over time. 
The Task Force determined that certain 
management practices discouraged excellence in schools. 
Chief among them was the fact that, "Schools lack the 
kind of peer support systems that encourage excellence 
in other professions and that are independent of 
compensation systems. 1131 
In September, 1987 the National School Boards 
Association and the Illinois Association of School 
Boards, jointly published Rewarding Excellence: 
Teacher Compensation and Incentive Plans.32 The 
publication is a part of what might be termed the 
result of the second wave of reform in education that 
31 Ibid. p.12. 
32 . d . . d" National School Boar s Assoc1at1on, Rewar ing 
Excellence: Teacher Compensation and Incentive Plans 
(Washington, D.C.: 1987). 
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began in 1985. It discussed some of the advantages and 
disadvantages to "monetary incentive programs." The 
NSBA found the following advantages of incentive pay 
programs: 
1.) They frequently emphasized evaluation. 2.) They 
of fer school districts a way of rewading outstanding 
teachers. 3.) They offer teachers career advancement 
without leaving the classroom. 4.) They are a way to 
motivate the performance of all teachers. 5.) They 
offer one way of building public support for education. 
The NSBA points out that research has identified 
two major disadvantages to monetary incentive programs: 
1.) They may not work under current teacher salary 
conditions. 2.) They may create dissatisfaction. The 
Association feels that in order to be successful, every 
merit pay program must be based upon a valid, reliable, 
objective performance appraisal method that is carried 
out by trained, qualified evaluators. 
The 1987 NSBA publication concludes with a quote 
from the House of Representatives report on merit pay 
stating that, "The question the Nation must face is not 
simply how to implement performance-based pay for 
*+r~-~~~ 
..,i'" '·-
educators, but how we can lift the standards of 
instruction in the Nation. 1133 
As part of its 1983-84 hot topics series, the 
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Phi Delta Kappa Center on Evaluation, Development and 
Research published , Merit Pay and Evaluation. 34 In a 
reprinted article from Personnel Administrator, 35 James 
T. Brinks, an expert in compensation, benefit plans and 
design and performance measurement systems, cites 
several arguments against merit increases. Amongst 
Brinks' list are: 1.) A general lack of objective work 
performance systems, especially for salaried employees. 
2.) Merit pay systems are difficult and costly to 
operate. 3.) Most people are not motivated by money, 
but rather by things such as advancement opportunity, 
nature of the work itself, etc. 4.) Most supervisors 
cannot make objective, valid distinctions in 
performance. 5.) A merit system emphasizes that the 
supervisor is "God." 6.) The vast majority of people 
see themselves as well above-average. Therefore, 
33
committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House 
of Representatives, "Merit Pay Task Force Report," 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1983), p.6. 
34Phi Delta Kappa.Merit Pay and Evaluation, 
(Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, Center on 
Evaluation, Development and Research, 1984). 
35 Ibid. p.21. 
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average merit increases destroy self-esteem and thus 
de-motivate the employee. 7.) Differing merit 
increases for the same work seem to go against the 
government's push for "equal pay for equal work." 8.) 
When inflation is six per cent or more, so much of the 
annual increase is due to range change that the merit 
portion is minimal. 9.) Merit pay increase budgets 
assume a bell-shaped performance population. In many 
organizations eighty per cent of the employees are in 
fact above-average performers. 10.) Most supervisors 
play it safe and give everyone close to average 
increases. Thus the best employees leave, the worst 
remain and are overcompensated. 11.) Most performance 
ratings are based upon personality characteristics, 
rather than objective results achieved. 
Using Frederick Herzberg's motivation-hygiene 
theory as a basis, Larry Frase, Robert Hetzel and 
Robert Grant36 discuss an instructional excellence and 
reward system implemented in their school district. 
Citing Herzberg's theory that satisfaction (motivation) 
and dissatisfaction (hygiene) are two separate factors 
36 Larry E. Frase, Robert W. Hetzel and Robert T. 
Grant, "Promoting Instructional Excellence Through a 
Teacher Reward System: Herzberg's Theory Applied," 
Planning and Changing, Vol. XIII, No.2, (1982) p.67. 
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that impact job performance, Frase, et al., outline a 
program that they found successful. Recognizing that· 
opposition to merit pay included such reasons as: 
1.) Merit rating cannot fairly evaluate the true 
effectiveness of teachers. 2.) Merit rating rewards 
conformity. 3.) Merit rating places a premium on 
teachers who conduct their classsrooms with a minimum 
of problems for administration. 4.) Merit rating 
fosters a competitive rather than cooperative spirit. 
5.) Merit rating threatens the security of teachers. 
6.) Merit rating disregards the type of environment in 
which a teacher teaches. 7.) Merit rating cannot 
improve the quality of teaching. A plan based upon 
Herzberg's theory was designed to provide recompense to 
teachers for excellent performance in the classroom. 
The plan was developed with the purpose of 
motivating individuals to continue excellent practices 
in the classroom in working with students. The most 
significant aspect of the recompense plan, was the 
capability of competent administrators at identifying 
excellence in the classroom. Principals recommended 
teachers to the superintendent for recognition. Funds 
were distributed proportionately amongst the district's 
schools. Rewards included, attendance at out-of-state 
professional conferences, cash, and instructional 
materials. Value of the rewards ranged from eighty to 
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several hundred dollars. Following implementation of 
the program teachers were interviewed and completed a· 
questionnaire. Frase, et al, found that the rewards 
most highly valued by teachers was attendance at 
conferences, the reward least valued was money. 
Teachers felt that recognition in the form of money was 
unprofessional. While the recognition program appears 
to be successful, dissension within the teaching ranks 
continues to be a problem with some teachers expressing 
the desire to maintain secrecy over their recognition, 
while others wish to have their notoriety published in 
local newspapers. The author's concluded, however, 
that the program is successful in that both motivation 
and hygiene needs, as cited by Herzberg's theory, are 
met and have a positive effect upon instructional 
performance in the classroom. 
Writing in the April, 1983 Personnel Journal, 
Silverman37 cites ten reasons why the performance pay 
system failed in the federal government. As part of 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the performance 
pay system became fully implemented in 1981. However, 
Silverman maintains that the system, whose objective 
37Buddy Robert s. Silverman, "Why the Merit Pay 
System Failed in the Federal Government," Personnel 
Journal, LXII, No. 4, (April, 1983) p.294. 
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was to make reward and recognition more commensurate 
with productivity, became a "shambles" and actually 
disrupted the bureaucracy with complex procedures and 
an overwhelming amount of paper work. Silverman 
contends that the performance pay system had a 
devastating effect on cooperation and stimulated 
competition within units of government. Additionally, 
Silverman says that merit pay failed because of 
unintended statutory provisions, open-ended 
regulations, novice technical assistance, drifting 
implementation policies, flagrant administrative 
errors, ludicrously complicated systems, inconsistent 
employee treatment, motivational factors, managerial 
pay compression, and simultaneous budget restrictions. 
Finally, Silverman contends that the merit pay 
system in the federal government did the same thing the 
old system of compensation did, except that the 
additional cost to tax payers was a billion more 
dollars. In essence, according to Silverman, politics 
destroyed merit pay. 
In a 1983 study Pruitt38 found strong support 
for merit pay programs among school systems that were 
currently using performance-based salary programs. The 
38sid c. Pruitt Jr., "Merit Pay for Classroom 
Teachers" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, North Texas 
State University, 1983). 
groups also strongly held the belief that merit pay 
plans could be successful. The study also concluded 
that merit pay should improve the quality of 
instruction and would retain good teachers in the 
nation's classrooms. 
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The Pruitt study surveyed the superintendent and 
teacher union presidents in 139 merit pay school 
districts and found that the basis of merit pay 
decisions should be the quality of classroom 
instruction. Professional growth, extra sevice and 
creative activities should be secondary activities and 
not become part of the consideration in making merit 
pay decisions. The study also revealed that 
evaluations should be made by principals, assistant 
principals and department chairmen. Teacher 
self-evaluation was also seen as an important element 
in the evaluation process. Respondents favored 
professional educators as being the primary 
participants in the development of incentive pay plans. 
Finally, Pruitt's study concluded that merit pay plans 
should serve to motivate teachers to improve their 
classroom instructional practices. 
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In a 1983 study39 Rike surveyed Illinois 
principals and teachers in an effort to determine the · 
perceptions each group held about the methods and 
criteria that should be utilized to evaluate teacher 
performance in order to differentiate teaching status 
or for merit pay purposes. The study also sought to 
determine what criteria teachers deemed appropriate for 
principals to evaluate their performance. The research 
also attempted to assess what criteria principals felt 
they could utilize in measuring teacher performance for 
differentiated staffing positions or performance pay. 
Finally, the study sought to determine if there were 
major differences between the perceptions held by 
teachers and principals concerning the criteria, 
methods, and the principals' ability to assess teacher 
performance. 
Rike's research study of 120 elementary school 
teachers and 64 elementary school principals clearly 
revealed that both groups favored classroom observation 
as the primary method for evaluating teachers 
(teachers, 67%~ principals, 70%). The second choice 
for teachers was interviews (30%), followed by goal 
39cheryl Jo Rike, "Iliinois Elementary Teachers' 
and Principals' Perceptions of the Evaluative Methods 
and Criteria Which Should Be Used to Designate Merit 
Pay," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Southern 
Illinois University, 1984). 
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setting (17%). The principals' second choice was goal 
setting (30%), followed by student achievement (23%). · 
The data from the Rike study was instrumental in 
developing the following conclusions: 1.) Both teachers 
and principals prefer neither a master teacher or merit 
pay plan, but a combination of both. 2.) The most 
appropriate evaluator according to both groups is the 
principal. Teachers however, would accept a team of 
evaluators that would include other teachers. 3.) 
Classroom observation is the preferred method of 
evaluation for both groups, with goal setting an 
appropriate second. 4.) Of the 115 criteria listed by 
the researcher, principals viewed all criteria as 
acceptable measures of evaluation; teachers accepted 
all but two, ( "is viewed as an attractive personality 
by students and colleagues,'' and "willingly and 
effectively sponsors extra-curricular activities"). 
5.) Teachers had a lower level of confidence in the 
principals' ability to rate all criteria listed in the 
study. Major differences of opinion existed between 
teachers and principals over such items as use of 
instructional time, selection of methodology, 
assessment procedures, assignment techniques and pupil 
control. 6.) Both principals and teachers were 
concerned over the lack of formal training principals 
receive in evaluating teacher performance. 7.) Both 
teachers, principals and educational research 
illustrated a concern over the amount of time deemed 
appropriate to teacher performance appraisal and the 
amount of time actually devoted to the enterprise. 
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This point, according to the researcher, would seem to 
indicate that a principals' job description should 
state teacher evaluation as a priority. 8.) Teachers, 
principals and research revealed a concern over 
principal objectivity in evaluating teachers. 
9.) Principals indicated that a personal lack of 
teaching experience at the elementary school level was 
a hindrance in effectively evaluating teachers. 
Planck's 1985 study40 of sixteen rural Indiana 
teachers' perceptions of merit pay revealed that 
teachers had a fear of merit pay. The study was based 
upon focused, in-depth interviews with the sixteen 
elementary and secondary school teachers. Teachers 
interviewed revealed that as a group teachers fear the 
merit pay concept. Each teacher doubted that merit pay 
would help the district meet its goals. The major 
concern teachers held with regard to merit pay was 
those who would be charged with evaluating. Teachers 
40Jacquie Tinsley Planck, "Does Fear of Merit 
Pay Exist? An Exploratory Study,'' (unpublished Ed.D. 
dissertation, George Peabody College for Teachers of 
Vanderbilt University, 1985). 
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interviewed, generally believed that no evaluation tool 
existed that would truly evaluate a superior teacher. 
A majority of teachers felt that a committee of 
evaluators would produce the "fairest " results. 
Teachers did not favor the principal as the sole 
evaluator. Primary concerns over merit pay were that 
it would create an atmosphere of rivalry thoughout the 
school building. Teachers express concern that the 
present atmosphere of sharing of ideas and materials 
and air of cooperation might fade if merit pay existed 
in the school. 
In a 1985 study41 of District of Columbia 
teachers, Gafney found that a majority of the teachers 
surveyed: 1.) did not favor an incentive salary system, 
nor did they feel that such a system would aid teachers 
financially, 2.) favored teacher involvement in the 
development of a merit pay plan, but felt that such a 
plan would not enhance teaching professionally, 3.) 
believed that evaluations are too subjective and that 
an incentive salary system would not be administered 
fairly, 4.) believed that the best and brightest 
individuals are not attracted to teaching, however, 
41 . f " I t' Louvenia Magee Ga ney, ncen ive Pay Systems 
As Viewed by Teachers in Selected Schools Within the 
District of Columbia Public School System," 
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, George Washington 
University, 1985). 
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they agreed that teachers in certain academic areas 
should not receive higher salaries in an attempt at 
eliminating shortages in those areas, 5.) believed that 
an incentive salary would not be useful in keeping 
better teachers in the profession or would be useful in 
terminating poor teachers, 6.) did not believe that an 
incentive salary system would aid students, society, or 
achieve excellence in education. 
Gafney 42 did find two significant differences 
in response to two questions in her survey. Teachers 
with less than ten years experience beleived that an 
incentive salary system would attract brighter minds to 
the profession, while those with more than ten years 
experience disagreed. Gafney also found that those 
teachers who held a master's degree or higher held the 
belief that their administrator/supervisor would not 
fairly administer an incentive salary system. Those 
teachers surveyed who have earned less than the 
master's degree believed that their present 
administrator/supervisor would fairly administer an 
incentive salary system. 
Conclusions from Gafney's research indicate that 
the less experienced teacher will view an incentive 
salary system more favorably, while a more highly 
42 Ibid. p.81. 
educated teacher will view incentive salary systems 
less favorably. 
LITERATURE RELATING TO ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE 
The pioneering study of the organizational 
climate of schools was completed by Andrew W. Halpin 
and Don B. Croft in 1962. 43 Their approach to 
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organizational climate, was to map teacher-teacher and 
teacher-principal relationships through the use of a 
descriptive questionnaire that would aid in the 
identification of those relationships. Halpin and 
Croft's observations were that schools differed in 
their feel. The idea of morale did not provide an 
index of a school's feel. In schools where improvement 
was needed, assignment of the "right" principal for the 
job often resulted in the imobilization of the 
principal by the faculty. Through the work of Halpin 
and Croft the Organizational Climate Description 
Questionnaire was developed. Originally consisting of 
sixty-four items, teachers were asked to respond to the 
43A.W. Halpin and D.B. Croft,The Organizational 
Climate of Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of 
Education, Research Project, August, 1962). 
question: To what extent is this true of your school? 
Responses were scaled along a four point continuum: 
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1- rarely occurs, 2- sometimes occurs, 3- often occurs, 
and 4- very frequently occurs. Halpin and Croft's 
instrument was used to identify eight characteristics 
of a school's faculty, what Halpin and Croft called the 
OCDQ subscales. Four of the subscales referred to 
teacher to teacher relations and are defined as: 
Hindrance, teacher feelings that the principal burdens 
them with routine duties and other responsibilities 
that are seen as "busywork". Intimacy, teacher 
enjoyment of warm, friendly personal relationships with 
one another. Disengagement, the likelihood that 
teachers merely, "go through the motions", lacking 
commitment to the job. Esprit, growth of morale due to 
a sense of task accomplishment and social satisfaction. 
The other four subscales of the OCDQ referred to 
teacher-principal relationships and are defined as: 
Productivity emphasis, a highly directive principal who 
supervises closely and is insensitive to faculty 
feedback. Aloofness, a go-by-the-book principal, 
characterized by formal, impersonal behavior. 
Consideration, warm and friendly principal behavior 
that features a principal who is helpful and does extra 
things for the faculty. Thrust, a leadership style 
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that features a principal who sets an example for the 
faculty. 
Using scores from the subscales of the OCDQ, it 
is then possible to identify a school's climate along a 
continuum from open to closed. Halpin and Croft's 
research identified six types of school climate: open, 
autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and closed. 
Schools with an open climate would feature a high level 
of esprit, high thrust, high consideration, high 
intimacy, low production emphasis, low aloofness, low 
disengagement and low hindrance. Teachers work well 
together and are committed. Leadership is appropriate 
and emerges as needed. In the closed climate school, 
esprit and thrust are low and disengagement high, as 
are production emphasis and aloofness. Frequently 
teacher apathy and frustration results. In determining 
a school's openness index Halpin and Croft used the 
following: 
OPENNESS INDEX = Thrust score + Esprit score -
Disengagement score 
The higher the index score, the more open the school's 
climate. 
Hoy and Miske144 report several criticisms of 
44
wayne K. Hoy and Cecil G. Miskel, Educational 
Administration: Theory Reasearch and Practice (New 
York: Random House, 1987). 
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the OCDQ. Chief among the criticisms was the 
weaknesses in what might be termed the middle types of 
school climates. 45 Halpin and Croft themselves, Hoy 
and Miskel report, were more confident about the two 
types of climates on the opposite ends of the spectrum 
than those in the middle. 46 Hoy and Clover, 47 in 
making their case for a new or revised OCDQ, report 
that attempts to replicate the six types of school 
climates identified by Halpin and Croft (open, 
autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and 
closed), often failed. 48 
Another problem that frequently arises with the 
OCDQ is the unit of analysis. Halpin and Croft's 
original research focused on individuals. Analysis of 
their data was based upon 1151 individuals, not the 
seventy-one schools in which those teachers were 
employed. 49 Hoy and Clover feel that a conceptual 
45
rbid. p.228. 
46
rbid. p.228. 
47 Wayne K. Hoy and Sharon I.R. Clover, 
"Elementary School Climate: A Revision of the OCDQ," 
Educational Administration Quarter! , Vol.XX!!, No. 1, 
Winter, 1986 p.93. 
48 Ibid. p. 95. 
49 Ibid. p. 96. 
behavior, the remaining three dimensions describe 
teacher behavior. 
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Hoy and Clover's three principal dimensions may 
be summarized as: Supportive, the principal listens 
and is supportive of teachers. Praise is frequent and 
genuine, criticism constructive. Principal displays 
both a personal and professional interest in teachers. 
Directive, the principal maintains close, constant 
control and supervision over teachers and school 
activities. Restrictive, principal behavior hinders 
rather than facilitates teacher work. The principal 
imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other 
mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching 
duties. 
The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the 
OCDQ-RE may be described as: Collegial, supportive, 
open and professional interactions exist among 
teachers. Faculty members enjoy working with one 
another: enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of 
professional competence of colleagues exists. 
Disengaged, a lack of meaning and focus to professional 
activities exists. Faculty is non-productive in group 
or team-building activities. No common goals exist 
amongst teaching staff. Faculty behavior is often 
negative and they are critical of their colleagues and 
the organization. Intimate, a cohesive strong network 
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Directive, the principal maintains close, constant 
control and supervision over teachers and school 
activities. Restrictive, principal behavior hinders 
rather than facilitates teacher work. The principal 
imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other 
mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching 
duties. 
The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the 
OCDQ-RE may be described as: Collegial, supportive, 
open and professional interactions exist among 
teachers. Faculty members enjoy working with one 
another~ enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of 
professional competence of colleagues exists. 
Disengaged, a lack of meaning and focus to professional 
activities exists. Faculty is non-productive in group 
or team-building activities. No common goals exist 
amongst teaching staff. Faculty behavior is often 
negative and they are critical of their colleagues and 
the organization. Intimate, a cohesive strong network 
of social support exists among faculty. Teachers know 
each other well, become personal friends, and socialize 
frequently. 
The result of Hoy and Clover's work is a 
forty-two item instrument that consists of six subtests 
that describe the behavior of elementary school 
principals and teachers. One element of the original 
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OCDQ devised by Halpin and Croft is eliminated 
(aloofness). The esprit subtest of Halpin and Croft's 
original is replaced by collegial teacher behavior. 
The hindrance dimension of the original OCDQ is 
eliminated, but is included in restrictive principal 
behavior. 
The new OCDQ features two factors. One factor 
measures the openness of teacher-principal relations, 
the other is a measure of openness of teacher 
interactions. In the OCDQ-RE, it is possible to have 
open teacher interactions and closed teacher-principal 
interactions and vice versa. Therefore, four types of 
school organizational climate are possible: 1.) Both 
factors may be closed. 2.) Both factors may be open. 
3.) The principal may be open, but the faculty closed 
with one another (disengaged). 4.) The principal may 
be closed, but the faculty interactions may be open 
(engaged). 
The six subtests of Hoy and Clover's OCDQ-RE 
have high reliability coefficients. More importantly, 
the unit of analysis of the OCDQ-RE is the school, not 
the individuals. Aspects of school climate are 
organizational properties, not individual properties. 
Each set of behaviors is defined by the construct of 
openness and provide for a four-celled typology of 
school organizational climate: open, closed, engaged 
and disengaged. 
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In his 1983 work, A Place Called Schoo1, 51 John 
Goodlad devotes considerable discussion to elements of 
organizational climate in which teachers work. In his 
chapter entitled, "Teachers and the Circumstances of 
Teaching," 52 Goodlad relates bits of 
information that are important in understanding the 
workings of what goes on in schools. At the same time 
he provides insights into the organizational climates 
of the schools that served as the background of his 
book. 
John Goodlad recognizes that several factors 
make up what he calls, "the quality of school life." 53 
Among those factors are teacher behavior, the principal 
and collaboration. Clearly, as we have seen through 
the work of Halpin and Croft, and Hoy and Clover 
teacher behavior and the principal are important, if 
not mandatory, factors that contribute to the 
organizational climate of a school. In a very real 
sense so does the element of collaboration. For 
51John I. Goodlad, A Place Called School (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1984). 
52 Ibid. p.167. 
53 Ibid. p.160. 
through collaboration with colleagues and principals, 
as well as students and parents, collegial working 
relationships can be established that aid in the 
development of an open organizational climate. 
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In his book, Goodlad relates that most school 
environments fall short in enabling teachers to 
establish personal relationships with one another. He 
characterizes teaching as a lonely profession and 
expresses concern for, "what effects this might have on 
teacher behaviors, self-renewal, and relations with 
students. 1154 Of great importance is the fact that 
Goodlad reports that most teachers, (80% at the 
elementary level) expressed a high degree of career 
fulfillment. What prompts people to leave teaching, 
according to Goodlad, are not interpersonal conflicts 
between teachers and administrators, or for that matter 
problems with students. Teachers are bothered most by 
personal frustrations and disssatisfaction in the 
teaching situation. 
Goodlad's concern is that the profession is able 
to secure and maintain an able corps of professionals. 
He calls for improvement in salary conditions and, more 
importantly, the need to enhance the profession by 
54
rbid. p.171. 
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improving its working conditions. He points out that 
improved conditions would increase both satisfaction 
and productivity.SS Among these improved conditions he 
calls for supportive and sensitive principal 
leadership, greater enthusiasm, career fulfillment, 
teacher assistance programs and professionalism. 
Goodlad's data on school climate was derived 
from a list of 120 questions posed to teachers. These 
questions dealt with teacher autonomy, friendships with 
other teachers, personal satisfaction, resources, 
students, parents, personal safety, facilities and so 
on. What emerged from Goodlad's study was support for 
the hypothesis that schools that possess teacher·s who 
are satisfied with their careers and teaching 
circumstances are perceived to provide students with a 
good education. This Goodlad contends leads to the 
proposition that the, "quality of education provided by 
a school, depends on the interaction between 
teachers--more or less competent, more or less 
satisfied, and the circumstances of schooling."S6 
Other aspects that affect organizational climate 
that come from Goodlad's study include a relationship 
SSibi'd. 176 p. • 
S6 Ib1' d. 178 p. • 
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between teacher satisfaction and strong leadership on 
the part of the principal. Also, the data showed that 
staff cohesiveness and the way in which problems were 
solved as well as aspects of the decision making 
process were elements that are highly related to 
teacher satisfaction. At more satisfying schools, the 
data indicated that fewer teachers saw the 
administration or staff relations as problems. That 
was not the case at what Goodlad termed the "less 
satisfying schools." 
In 1986, the United States Department of 
Education published, What Works: Research About 
Teaching and Learning. 57 The sixty-five page 
booklet consisted of forty-one research findings in 
education. Included in the publication were allusions 
to research findings that dealt with organizational 
climate. With regard to principals What Works made it 
clear that effective principals are supportive of 
effective instruction. The publication also clearly 
stated that the students are the benefactors of 
professional collegiality among faculty members. It 
was pointed out that it is important for teachers to 
57
united States Department of Education, What 
Works: Research About Teachin and Learnin 
Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Education, 1986), pp. 32-34. 
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share ideas, cooperate in activities, and assist one 
another in intellectual growth. Finally, What Works 
made note of the fact that teachers welcome 
professional suggestions about improving the quality of 
their work, but rarely did they receive them. 
Expanding on their work in the area of 
cooperative learning, David and Robert Johnson 
discussed their research on collegial learning groups 
in the November, 1987 Educational Leadership. 58 They 
stress that cooperation with other teachers is 
important because much of what teachers need to know is 
procedural in nature. They contend that collegial 
support groups of fer a formalized structure to assist 
teachers in improving their on-the-job performance. 
Such a program, they argue, is needed because in citing 
Blake and Mouton's work, "teachers have not been 
skilled in working with their peers." 59 Teachers and 
administrators have for too long worked independently 
as opposed to interdependently. About merit pay, the 
Johnson's claim that such programs have a harmful 
effect upon teaching environments because they are 
58
oavid W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson, 
"Research Shows the Benefits of Adult Cooperation," 
Educational Leadership, Vol. VL. No. 3, (November, 
1987) p.27. 
59
rbid. p.27. 
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built upon competition. Teachers maximize personal 
gain at the expense of their colleagues. Instead, the 
Johnson's support a merit pay system that bases awards 
upon how well all members of the group performed. In 
such a system, teachers accept the responsibility to 
improve not only their own productivity, but that of 
the entire group as well. The Johnson's contend that a 
cooperative structure to school faculties develops 
social support, professional self-esteem, positive 
interpersonal relationships and achievement. An 
analysis of their study bears out this claim.60 
In the March, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan, Gene 
Maeroff writes that, "As long as teachers are not 
adequately valued by themselves and by others, they are 
not apt to perform with the necessary assurance and 
authority to do the job as well as they can." 61 
Maeroff points out that teaching, more than any other 
profession, is practiced in isolation. Collegiality for 
most teachers is nonexistent. This lack of 
collegiality, coupled with low salaries causes teachers 
to lack respect for themselves as well as their fellow 
faculty members. 
GOibid. p.29. 
61Gene I. Maeroff, "A Blueprint for Empowering 
Teachers," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LXVIV, No. 7. (March, 
1988) p.473. 
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Maerof f proposes a system of empowering teachers 
to play a more active role in decision making. He does 
not propose the elimination of the principal's role, 
but instead he supports a collaborative relationship 
between teachers and principals. Such a system not 
only raises the esteem level of teachers but creates a 
more enthusiastic professional environment. Teachers 
support one another and collegiality develops between 
administrators and teachers who work together as 
partners and share the power to improve the school 
environment. 
Writing in the May, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan, 
Lieberman62 points out that researchers have found 
that collegiality must exist in schools before a more 
professional cultural environment can be developed. 
She states that, " ••• when principals encourage and 
facilitate collegial work, the resultant interactions 
among teachers build norms of collaboration. 1163 
Lieberman also reports that in collaborative schools 
teachers perceive their principals as supportive. 
Teachers view problems as opportunities for collective 
62Ann Lieberman, "Teachers and Principals: Turf, 
Tension and New Tasks," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LXIX, 
No. 9, (May, 1988) p.648. 
63 Ibid. p.650. 
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learning. In isolated schools, however, teachers tend 
to be alienated from their principals and view their 
requests as threats to the principal 1 s self-esteem. 
In the February, 1988 Educational Leadership, 
Lieberman writes, "In schools characterized by 
collaborative relationships teachers seek out each 
other for help: and principals support the idea that 
any problem of any teacher can be worked out 
collectively." 64 By developing schools that are 
collaborative in nature it is possible, according to 
Lieberman, to restructure the profession. The 
possibilities of a restructured profession include: 
1.) building collegiality, 2.) providing greater 
recognition and status for teachers, 3.) enlarging the 
reward structure, 4.) building a school structure that 
permits autonomy, flexibility and responsibility, 
S.) reshaping teaching as an occupation that encourages 
young people to become teachers and at the same time 
encourages experienced teachers to share their work, 
6.) building a professional culture in schools that 
64Ann Lieberman, "Expanding the Leadership Team," 
Educational Leadeership, Vol. XLV, No.S (February, 
1988) p.4. 
broadens the way they function and become more 
. . t th . . t. 65 sensitive o eir communi ies. 
To summarize, the related literature regarding 
merit pay continually drives home the point that 
performance pay systems are an attempt to achieve and 
recognize excellence, and at the same time garner 
public support for education. The proponents of 
incentive systems support these programs in an effort 
to improve the public's perceptions of the teaching 
profession. Merit pay programs are viewed as methods 
of recognizing excellence in teaching and as a way of 
luring the best and the brightest into a profession 
that is no longer attractive. It is the belief of 
many, that through the development and implementation 
60 
of merit pay, public confidence in education will once 
again be restored and the productivity of the 
institution assured. 
Detractors of merit pay are wont to point out 
that such programs have a disastrous effect upon staff 
morale. Additionally, they point out that 
performance-based salary programs are costly, not only 
in dollars but in the additional time needed to 
appropriately evaluate teaching. Opponents of 
65 Ibid. p.8. 
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incentive pay systems question whether the public would 
support financially the increased costs such programs 
would bear. Those who do not look favorably on merit 
pay, question the existence of objective evaluation 
systems and the training programs needed to adequately 
train those who will make merit award decisions. 
The related literature dealing with 
organizational climate clearly makes the point that the 
organizational climate of schools can be measured. It 
is possible to determine the typology of a school's 
climate. The apppropriate unit of analysis is the 
school. Such measures are based upon the perceptions 
faculty members have about teacher interactions and 
teacher-principal relations. 
The related literature points out that more open 
schools tend to be perceived as more successful 
schools. The literature indicates that certain 
qualities and characteristics of human dynamics may 
improve a school's organizational climate. Working 
conditions also play an important role in improving the 
level of job satisfaction that teachers hold. 
To some extent, unlike the proponents of merit 
pay, those with an interest in organizational theory 
believe that the drive toward excellence and improved 
productivity can be reached through a better 
environment in the workplace. A better climate may be 
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achieved through collaboration. It has been said that 
teaching is a profession carried out in isolation. 
Schools need to improve upon the level of collegiality 
that exists in them. The related literature points out 
that this is possible by involving people in problem 
solving and decision making practices. Through 
involvement, individuals gain a sense of dignity, 
respect and partnership that leads to gains in 
productivity in the search for excellence. 
CHAPTER III 
Methodology 
The "Year of Education," in Illinois was 1985. 
In June of that year, the Illinois General assembly 
enacted Senate Bill 730 and House Bill 1070. Jointly, 
these two pieces of legislation brought about, or 
proposed to bring about, sweeping changes in education 
throughout the State. The package of educational 
reform bills was enacted into law on July 18, 1985 when 
both bills were signed by Governor James Thompson. 
Among the provisions of Senate Bill 730 was a 
compensation study and the establishment of the Center 
for Excellence in Teaching. The legislation 
appropriated $3,500,000 in grants for the development 
of pilot studies of career compensation programs in 
five to seven Illinois school districts. The Bill 
further called upon such programs to, "provide 
compensation for extraordinary teaching, innovation, 
leadership or assumption of additional 
responsibilities. They may include extended teacher 
contracts, career ladder or performance based pay. 1166 
The Act further called upon the Center for 
66Ted Sanders, S.B. 730, H.B. 1070 (Springfield, 
Il.: Illinois State Board of Education, June, 1985), 
Topic #61. 
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Excellence in Teaching to report upon the success of 
such programs to the Joint Education Committee of the· 
Legislature, the governor, and the General Assembly by 
December 31, 1986. The State Board of Education was to 
further recommend to the General Assembly the need to 
revise sections of the legislation or if any of the 
pilot programs should be extended to all Illinois 
schools districts. On December 9, 1985 the Illinois 
State Board of Education issued a request for proposals 
to all Illinois school districts for submission of 
proposals in compliance with Senate Bill 730. School 
districts had until January 22, 1986 to submit 
proposals for compensation plans. 
In April of 1987, the forty member "Blue Ribbon 
Committee on the Improvement of Teaching as a 
Profession'' released its preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations. The Committee was comprised of 
members from both the education community and the 
general public. Established jointly by the Illinois 
State Board of Education and the Board of Higher 
Education, the Committee's task was to make 
recommendations, appropriate to Illinois, that would 
improve the nature of teaching. Recommendation 
twenty-five read, 
The State Board of Education should seek funding 
for continuation of the study of teacher career 
compensation issues, with special emphasis on 
programs which respond to public concerns about 
acknowledging excellence and rewarding results or 
productivity in teaching. The continued study of 
compensation issues should build on activities now 
in place in Illinois and should consider 
how to do at least the following: 
a.) Identify and reward superior teaching 
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b.) Reward teachers, either individually or on a 
school-by-school bg,is for the learning performance 
of their students. 
Recommendation twenty-six stated, "The State 
Board of Education should initiate the establishment, 
through public or private funds, a unique means for 
recognizing and rewarding extraordinary teachers. 1168 
In the Summer of 1987, the Illinois State Board 
of Education was contacted in order to identify 
Illinois school districts that employed merit pay 
systems for teachers. A list of twenty-one Illinois 
school districts using merit pay systems was obtained 
from the State Board of Education. Of those twenty-one 
districts, seventeen were K-8 districts, three were 
9-12 districts and one was a unit district. In an 
attempt to limit the study to the Chicago metropolitan 
area, it was found that most plans were in actuality 
career ladder plans or were no longer operational. 
67Ted Sanders, "Announcement of Public Hearings 
on the Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations of 
the Blue Ribbon On The Improvement of Teaching As A 
Profession"( Springfield, IL.: Illinois State Board of 
Education, April 9, 1987), p.11. 
68 Ibid. p.11. 
only two of the K-8 districts contacted that had 
operational merit pay plans agreed to participate in 
this study. 
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The final selection of the merit pay schools in 
this study was made by the superintendents of the two 
merit pay school districts that agreed to participate. 
The selection of the non-merit pay schools was also 
made by the superintendents of the non-merit pay 
districts. Of the four schools in the study, school 
populations ranged between 300 and 480 students. Three 
of the schools were K-5 schools and one non-merit pay 
school was a K-6 school. The number of teachers at 
each school varied. The largest number of teachers 
were found at the merit pay schools, with the 
principals reporting teaching populations of 
approximately thirty teachers at each school. The 
non-merit pay principals reported teaching populations 
between twenty and twenty-five teachers. All of the 
schools in the study were within ten miles of each 
other, three of the schools were in neighboring, 
contiguous school districts. 
In the fall of 1987, Professor Wayne K. Hoy of 
Rutgers University was contacted with regard to 
securing permission to utilize the Organizational 
Climate Description Questionnaire - RE for the purposes 
of this study. Professor Hoy granted permission to use 
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the OCDQ-RE with the stipulation that his article 
regarding the development of the instrument be 
referenced, in addition to sharing the research results 
of the study with him. 
In early May, 1988 the copies of the OCDQ-RE as 
well as demographic data sheets were delivered to each 
of the participating schools in the study. Surveys 
were distributed to the faculties of each school by the 
principals. Eleven days after the OCDQ-RE was 
delivered to each school they were picked up by the 
researcher. Two weeks after the initial collection of 
research data, in an effort to increase the response 
rate, additional copies of the instrument and 
demographic data sheet were delivered to the schools. 
Included in the follow-up were return postage envelopes 
that would enable teachers not completing the initial 
survey to mail their response directly to the 
researcher. 
The data from the OCDQ-RE responses and the 
demographic data sheets were tabulated for the purposes 
of eliciting mean numerical scores for each item. The 
mean scores for each item were then summed to produce a 
school score for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE. The 
higher the score for each subtest, the stronger the 
element in the school, whether it be teacher 
collegiality, teacher intimacy, teacher disengagement, 
and principal support, principal directiveness, or 
principal restrictiveness. 
The sample for this study consisted of four 
elementary schools from Du Page County, Illinois. 
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Du Page County is a suburban county lying directly west 
of the city of Chicago. Of the four schools included 
in the sample, two schools were merit pay schools and 
two were non-merit pay schools. A demographic sketch 
of each of the schools in the study is as follows: 
School A 
School A is a merit pay school employing 32 
teachers. Student population is approximately 300 
students in grades kindergarten through five. A total 
of thirteen teachers completed responses for the 
purposes of this study. 
School B 
School B is also a merit pay school and employs 
30 teachers. Student population is approximately 470 
students in grades kindergarten through five. A total 
of twenty-two teachers completed responses for this 
research. 
School C 
School C is a non-merit pay school that employs 
25 teachers. Student population in this kindergarten 
through sixth grade school is approximately 470 
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students. A total of sixteen teachers completed both 
the OCDQ-RE and demographic survey used in this study.· 
School D 
School D is also a non-merit pay school. 
Student population in this kindergarten through fifth 
grade school is approximately 380 students. The 
faculty consists of 23 teachers. Fifteen teachers 
completed the two research instruments utilized in this 
study. 
In keeping with the design of Hoy's OCDQ-RE, the 
appropriate unit of analysis in the study of 
organizational climate is the school, not the 
individual. Therefore, individual scores for each 
subtest of the OCDQ-RE were computed, individual scores 
were totaled and divided by the total number of school 
building responses to produce mean scores for each 
subtest of the OCDQ-RE. Also in keeping with the 
design of the instrument, comparisons were made between 
groups in the sample since norms for the OCDQ-RE have 
not been established. A t test was performed to test 
the differences between groups and to assist in seeking 
the answers to the following research questions: 
1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay 
schools less open than that in non-merit 
pay schools? 
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less 
open than principals in non-merit pay 
schools? 
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more 
collegial than teachers in merit pay 
schools? 
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more 
directive? 
5. Are principals in merit pay schools less 
supportive? 
6. Are merit pay principals more restrictive 
than non-merit pay principals? 
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7. Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than 
non-merit pay teachers? 
8. Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit 
more intimate behavior than teachers in 
non-merit pay schools? 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF DATA 
As previously discussed, a total of sixty-six 
teachers responded to the two instruments used in this 
study. At School A, a merit pay school, thirteen of 
thirty-two teachers completed the instruments. All 
respondents were female. Six teachers held a Master's 
degree, all others held a Bachelor's degree. All but 
two of the teachers were members of the National 
Education Association. Three teachers had 0 -5 years 
teaching experience: three had 6-10 years experience: 
two teachers had 11-15 years of experience: three had 
between 16-20 years experience, and two teachers had 
more than 20 years of experience. Ten of the 
respondents were married, two were single and one was 
divorced. 
At School B, the second merit pay school, 
twenty-two of the school's thirty teachers completed 
the OCDQ-RE and demographic surveys. Three teachers 
had 0-5 years experience: ten had 6-10 years teaching 
experience: four had 11-16 years experience: another 
three had 16-20 years experience, and two had taught 
for more than 20 years. All respondents were female. 
Sixteen teachers were members of the American 
72 
Federation of Teachers, six had no union affiliation. 
Fifteen respondents were married, six were single, one 
was divorced. Thirteen teachers held a Bachelor's 
degree, and nine had Master's degrees. 
Of the sixteen teachers completing surveys at 
School C, a non-merit pay school, one had 0-5 years 
teaching experience; two had 6-10 years of experience; 
eight had taught for 11-15 years; three had 16-20 years 
teaching experience, and two had taught for more than 
twenty years. All respondents were female, twelve of 
whom were married, the remaining four were single. 
Thirteen of the sixteen School C respondents were 
members of the National Education Association. Five 
teachers held Bachelor's degrees, ten held a Master's 
degree, and one teacher had a PhD. 
At School D, fifteen of the twenty-three faculty 
members completed the surveys used in this study. Two 
teachers had 0-5 years teaching experience; seven had 
taught between 6-10 years; four teachers had 11-15 
years of experience, and two had taught for more than 
20 years. Fourteen teachers were National Association 
of Education members. Ten teachers were married, four 
were single, and one was divorced. Five teachers had 
Master's degrees, all others held Bachelor's degrees. 
One of the School D respondents was male. 
TABLE 1 
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BY SCHOOL 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
ITEM 
0- 5 YRS. EXPERIENCE 
6-10 YRS. EXPERIENCE 
11-15 YRS. EXPERIENCE 
16-20 YRS. EXPERIENCE 
20+ YRS. EXPERIENCE 
MALE TEACHERS 
FEMALE TEACHERS 
BACHELOR'S DEGREE 
MASTER'S DEGREE 
DOCTOR'S DEGREE 
UNION MEMBERS 
NON-UNION MEMBERS 
MARRIED TEACHERS 
UNMARREID TEACHERS 
DIVORCED TEACHERS 
TOTAL RESPONSES 
A 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
0 
13 
7 
6 
0 
11 
2 
10 
2 
1 
13 
SCHOOL 
B c D 
3 1 2 
10 2 7 
4 8 4 
3 3 0 
2 2 2 
0 0 1 
22 16 14 
13 5 11 
9 10 5 
0 1 0 
16 13 14 
6 3 1 
15 12 14 
6 3 1 
1 0 1 
22 16 15 
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For the purpose of this study, a total of eight 
research questions were developed dealing with the 
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organizational climate of merit pay and non-merit pay 
schools. One of the primary functions of the study was 
to determine the openness of the organizational 
climates of both types of schools. Secondly, a t test 
was performed on the composite scores for each subtest 
of the OCDQ-RE for various groups in the study. A 
significance level of .OS was determined as appropriate 
for acceptance. The first research question posed, "Is 
the organizational climate in merit pay schools less 
open than that of non-merit pay schools?", seeks to 
determine if differences in openness levels exists in 
the two types of schools studied. Using the 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE, 
an openness index for faculty relations, in each school 
in the study was computed. The openness index for each 
school is computed for faculty relations by summing the 
standard scores for the collegial and intimate subtests 
of the OCDQ-RE and subtracting from the total the score 
for the disengaged subtest. The openness indices for 
each of the four schools are shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TYPE SCHOOL SCORE 
School A (merit pay) -1.16 
TABLE 2 -- CONTINUED 
School B (merit pay) 
School C (non-merit pay) 
School D (non-merit pay) 
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-1.17 
-1.37 
-1.29 
As illustrated in Table 2, the openness indices 
for both of the merit pay schools were slightly higher 
than those of the two non-merit pay schools. The two 
merit pay schools had openness indices of -1.16 (School 
A) and -1.17 (School B)~ while the two non-merit pay 
schools had indices of -1.37 (School C) and -1.29 
(School D) respectively. 
In addition to creating openness indices for 
each individual school for faculty relations, the 
schools were grouped by types and an openness index was 
developed for faculty relations accordingly. Table 3 
shows the openness indices for faculty relations for 
merit pay and non-merit pay schools by school type. 
TABLE 3 
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPES SCORE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS -1.165 
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TABLE 3 -- CONTINUED 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
-1.331 
Once again the standard scores indicate a 
slightly higher degree of openness in the area of 
faculty relations in the merit pay schools as opposed 
to the non-merit pay schools. 
In addition to establishing an openness index 
for faculty relations in each school, an openness index 
was also computed for principal behavior as perceived 
by teachers in keeping with the second research 
question, "Are principals in merit pay schools less 
open than principals in non-merit pay schools?" 
Openness indices for principal behavior for each of the 
schools studied are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
OPENNESS INDICES FOR PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL AND TYPE 
School A (Merit Pay) 
School B (Merit Pay) 
School C (Non-Merit Pay) 
School D (Non-Merit Pay) 
SCHOOL SCORE 
3.49 
1.59 
4.38 
3.23 
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As depicted in Table 4, the standardized scores 
for openness of principal behavior illustrates that the 
most open principal behavior is found in one of the two 
non-merit pay schools (School C) with a standardized 
score of 4.38. However, the next highest score for 
principal behavior, 3.49, was found in School A, a 
merit pay school. A standard score of 3.23 was found 
in School D a non-merit pay school. The second merit 
pay school, School B, had the lowest standardized score 
of 1.59. 
As with faculty relations, the schools were 
grouped by type, merit pay and non-merit pay, and 
standardized scores were computed for principal 
behavior and are shown in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
OPENNESS INDICES FOR PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
SCORE 
2.29 
3.38 
The grouped scores indicate that the non-merit 
pay schools had a combined higher degree of open 
principal behavior than did the merit pay schools. 
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What factors help to determine the degree of 
openness in each school? The OCDQ-RE is structured 
around six dimensions. Together, these six dimensions 
help to determine the openness of a school's 
organizational climate. Three dimensions, collegial, 
intimate and disengagement aid in determining the 
openness of faculty relations. The three dimensions 
that help to determine the openness of principal 
behavior are supportive, directive and restrictive. 
Accordingly, research questions were generated for each 
of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE. 
Faculty Collegial Behavior 
The third research question of this study deals 
with collegial behavior of faculty members, it asks, 
"Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial 
than teachers in merit pay schools?" The OCDQ-RE 
consists of eight items that deal with the collegial 
dimension, which may be defined as consisting of 
behavior among staff members that is supportive and 
professional. Generally, teachers elicit pride in 
their schools and enjoy working with their peers, they 
feel fulfilled and display enthusiasm and a positive 
attitude toward the school, their colleagues and 
profession. The eight items of the OCDQ-RE that help 
to determine collegial behavior of faculty members are 
shown in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
COLLEGIAL ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
1 The teachers accomplish their work with 
vim, vigor and pleasure. 
6* Teachers leave school immediately after 
school is over. 
12 Most of the teachers here accept the 
faults of their colleagues. 
19 Teachers help and support each other. 
26 Teachers are proud of their school 
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32 New teachers are readily accepted by their 
colleagues. 
37* Teachers socialize together in small, 
select groups. 
40 Teachers respect the professional 
competence of their colleagues 
* scored negatively 
Composite mean scores for the collegial dimension 
of the OCDQ-RE are shown in Table 7 by school types. 
TABLE 7 
COMPOSITE COLLEGIAL SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
25.75 
25.71 
*Sum= total of individual responses 
SUM* 
901.23 
797.00 
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Examination of the composite collegial scores 
indicates that, when grouped, the strength of the 
collegial property in both types of schools is similar. 
Table 8 further breaks down the composite collegial 
scores by individual schools. 
TABLE 8 
COLLEGIAL COMPOSITE SCORES BY INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL 
SCHOOL MEAN RESPONSES 
School A (merit pay) 24.84 13 
School B (merit pay) 26.04 22 
School c (non-merit pay) 25.87 16 
School D (non-merit pay) 24.60 15 
Total 25.43 66 
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For the purposes of this study, the statistical 
treatment involved the computation of mean scores for 
each of the six subtests of the OCDQ-RE produced by the 
various groups participating in the study. A t test 
was applied to the data to determine differences 
between the scores produced by each group. It was 
determined that through the t test, a level of .OS or 
beyond would be reported as significant. 
Analysis of the data between school types on the 
collegial dimension of the OCDQ-RE revealed no 
significant differences in collegiality between merit 
pay and non-merit pay schools. Analysis between 
individual schools did not reveal a statistically 
significant difference in collegiality between any of 
the schools participating in the study. While there 
appear to be differences in the collegial composite 
scores of the OCDQ-RE between individual schools, when 
the schools are grouped by type no significant 
differences in the strengths of the collegial 
properties can be detected. It is important to note 
however, that School B, a merit pay school, produced 
the strongest collegial score of all the schools in the 
study. 
In addition to analyzing the data between schools 
and school types, the data were also analyzed by 
teaching experience levels and union affiliation. 
82 
Examination of the data for the collegial dimension of 
the OCDQ-RE revealed no significant differences between 
teachers at the varying strata of teaching experience 
or between those teachers who held union membership and 
their colleagues who were not members of teacher's 
unions. 
However, analysis of the data between teachers 
with varying levels of teaching experience did reveal 
some significant differences between teachers with 0-5 
years of experience and their colleagues with 20 plus 
years of experience. The results revealed that the 
teachers with 20 plus years classroom experience 
maintained a higher level of collegiality than their 
less experienced peers. Teachers with 0-5 years 
experience produced a composite mean score of 23.22 on 
the collegial subtest, while their colleagues with more 
than twenty years of teaching experience had a 
composite mean of 27.50. A significant difference was 
found to exist between the two groups. 
Principal Directive Behavior 
The fourth research question in this study deals 
with the directive dimension of principal behavior and 
asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools more 
directive than principals in non-merit pay schools?" 
The question has relevance in that it seeks to 
determine the rigidity and distance that principals 
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keep between themselves and their teaching personnel. 
Principals who are directive seek to maintain a high 
degree of control over teachers and the activities of 
the school. Directive principals may be seen as 
autocratic and monitor even the most minute aspects of 
the school environment. They tend not to be concerned 
with the interpersonal relationships they have with 
their teachers. 
The directive dimension of principal behavior of 
the OCDQ-RE is determined through the utilization of 
nine items in the instrument. These items are 
delineated in Table 9. 
TABLE 9 
DIRECTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
5 The principal rules with an iron fist. 
10 The principal checks the sign-in sheet 
every morning. 
17 The principal schedules the work for the 
teachers. 
24 The principal corrects teachers' mistakes. 
30 The principal closely checks classroom 
(teacher) activities. 
84 
TABLE 9 -- CONTINUED 
35 The principal checks lesson plans. 
39 The principal is autocratic. 
40 The principal monitors everything teachers 
do. 
Scoring of the OCDQ-RE on the directive dimension 
of principal behavior by school types is illustrated in 
Table 10. The two merit pay schools produced a mean 
score of 25.48, while the mean score for the two 
non-merit pay schools was 15.87. The results of data 
analysis through the application of a t test revealed a 
significant difference between the two types of 
schools. 
TABLE 10 
COMPOSITE DIRECTIVE DIMENSION SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
25.48** 
15.87** 
*Sum = total of individual responses 
**Statistically significant 
SUM* 
928.33 
507.08 
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As shown in Table 11, a breakdown by individual 
schools indicates that School B, a merit pay school 
scored a great deal higher than the other three schools 
in the study including School A the other merit pay 
school. This score indicates that the highest level of 
principal directive behavior was found in a merit pay 
school. 
TABLE 11 
DIRECTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOLS 
SCHOOL MEAN RESPONSES 
School A (Merit Pay) 18.00** 13 
School B (Merit Pay) 29.91** 22 
School c (Non-Merit Pay) 12.37** 16 
School D (Non-Merit Pay) 19.60** 15 
Total 20.97 66 
**Statistically significant 
The application of a t test, revealed a 
significant difference in the scores between the two 
merit pay schools, Schools A and B. Analysis of the 
individual school data also revealed a significant 
difference between School A and B, both merit pay 
schools and School C, a non-merit pay school. Also, a 
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statistically significant difference exsisted between 
School B and School D, the second non-merit pay school 
in the study. Finally, a significant difference was 
revealed in the scores between the two non-merit pay 
schools, Schools C and D. 
Data analysis was also performed on the directive 
composite scores by union affiliation and length of 
teaching experience. No significant differences 
between teacher groups based upon union membership and 
non-union membership could be found. These results 
were consistent when the data was analyzed based upon 
length of teaching experience. On the directive 
subtest, union members produced a composite mean score 
of 21.11 while the composite mean score for non-union 
members was 20.38. Composite mean scores for the 
various strata of teaching experience revealed a score 
of 21.22 for those with 0-5 years experience: 23.36 for 
teachers having 6-10 years experience: 19.00 for those 
with 11-15 years of teaching experience: 20.22 for 
teachers with 16-20 years experience, and 19.37 for 
those teachers having taught more than twenty years. 
Although a comment section was not included as 
part of the data collection, three of the twenty-two 
teachers responding to the survey from School B made 
hand written comments under item ten of the 
Questionnaire. The item asked respondents to circle 
the appropriate response to the statement, "The 
principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning." 
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It appears from a majority of the responses from School 
B, that the school did not utilize a sign-in sheet 
procedure for teacher attendance. However, one of the 
teacher respondents made the following comment to item 
ten," •••• is extremely aware of who is late or on time." 
Another teacher replied to the statement by 
writing,"N/A" and then wrote,"But does manage to have a 
sense of whether staff are on time." A third School B 
teacher wrote, "No sign-in sheet but (name deleted) is 
aware of what time you arrive!" 
The comments made by these three School B staff 
members may be considered indicators as to why the 
directive dimension at School B was stronger than at 
the other three schools in the study. Although there 
were no significant differences discovered through 
statistical analysis of the data, the composite score 
on the directive subtest for School B (29.91), clearly 
indicates a much stronger directive dimension for 
principal behavior at this school when compared to the 
other schools. 
Principal Supportive Behavior 
Another dimension of principal behavior is the 
basis of the fifth research question in this study. 
The question asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools 
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less supportive?" Principals who are supportive enjoy 
positive interpersonal relationships with their staffs. 
The rapport between teachers and principal is genuine. 
Both teachers and the principal work together as a team 
to establish goals and willingly accept suggestions and 
feedback from each other. Communication is two way and 
unhindered. Teachers are provided with genuine, 
frequent, yet authentic praise and all criticism is 
constructive in nature. 
The Organizational Climate Description 
Questionnaire - RE, contains nine items that deal with 
the supportive dimension of principal behavior. The 
nine items appear in Table 12. 
TABLE 12 
SUPPORTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS ON THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
4 The principal goes out of his/her way to 
help teachers. 
9 The principal uses constructive criticism. 
15 The principal explains his/her reason for 
criticism to teachers. 
16 The principal listens to and accepts 
teachers' suggestions. 
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TABLE 12 -- CONTINUED 
22 The principal looks out for the personal 
welfare of teachers. 
23 The principal treats teachers as equals. 
28 The principal compliments teachers. 
29 The principal is easy to understand. 
42 The principal goes out of his/her way to 
show appreciation to teachers. 
As with the other dimensions of the OCDQ-RE, 
composite mean scores were computed for the supportive 
dimension of principal behavior by school type. The 
non-merit pay schools produced a stronger dimension of 
supportive principal behavior than did the merit pay 
schools. The non-merit pay school composite score 
score was 16.80, while the merit pay school composite 
mean score was 12.71. Composite mean scores by school 
type are shown in Table 13. 
TABLE 13 
COMPOSITE SUPPORTIVE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
12.71** 
16.80** 
*Sum = total of individual responses 
**Statistically significant 
SUM* 
444.99 
530.99 
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When viewed separately by individual schools, the 
picture developed in Table 13 tends to hold true to 
form for the individual schools. The two non-merit pay 
schools were consistent in that their composite mean 
scores were stronger than either of the two merit pay 
schools. School C had the strongest supportive 
dimension of principal behavior with a composite mean 
score of 17.00. School D also a non-merit pay school, 
had a composite mean score of 16.60 for the supportive 
dimension. 
The supportive composite mean scores for principal 
behavior on the OCDQ-RE for the merit pay schools was 
14.84 for School A and 11.45 for School B. The 
individual composite mean scores for supportive 
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principal behavior for all schools participating in the 
study are illustrated in Table 14. 
TABLE 14 
SUPPORTIVE COMPOSITE SCORE BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL MEAN RESPONSES 
School A (Merit Pay) 14.84** 13 
School B (Merit Pay) 11.45** 22 
School c (Non-Merit Pay) 17.00** 16 
School D (Non-Merit Pay) 16.60** 15 
Total 14.63 66 
**Statistically significant 
Statistical analysis of the data revealed a 
significant difference in mean supportive dimension 
scores between types of schools beyond the acceptance 
level of .05. Likewise when a t test was applied to 
the individual school scores, some significant 
differences between various groups in the study were 
found. A significant difference was found to exist 
between the two merit pay schools. School A showing a 
stronger supportive dimension. Additionally, School A 
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differed significantly from School C. A significant 
difference was also detected between School B, a merit 
pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay school. 
Finally, a statistically significant difference was 
also found to exist between School B and School D, the 
second non-merit pay school in the study. 
When analyzed by union affiliation, no significant 
differences were found to exist between teachers who 
were union members and their non-union counterparts. 
However, when a t test was performed on the data 
between groups at various levels of teaching 
experience, a statistically significant difference in 
scores was found to exist between teachers with 0-5 
years experience and those with 20 plus years of 
experience. Those teachers possessing 20 plus years 
experience elicited the stronger score. Teachers with 
0-5 years experience had a mean score of 12.77, those 
with more than twenty years experience produced a mean 
score of 16.50. Likewise, a significant difference 
existed between teachers with 11-15 years experience 
and those with 16-20 years experience, those having the 
fewer number of years experience producing the higher 
score. Those teachers having taught 11-15 years 
produced a mean of 15.38, those teachers in the 16-20 
year group produced a mean of 12.88, a significant 
difference between the two groups was detected. Also, 
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those with 16-20 years experience and those with 20 
plus years experience differed significantly, once 
again the 20 plus years group produced the higher 
score. Those teachers in the 16-20 year group had a 
mean score on the supportive dimension of 12.88, while 
those with twenty or more years experience had a mean 
score of 16.50. 
As previously mentioned, a comment section to this 
study was not included in the data gathering. However, 
as with the directive dimension previously discussed, a 
teacher from School B made a comment that refers to 
elements of supportive principal behavior at the end of 
the survey. The comment related that the principal 
utilized various methods to show appreciation to staff 
members through such activities as birthday cards, 
breakfasts and luncheons for special occasions and 
"upbeat cards." But the respondent wrote, "Then 
sabotages these attempts with the way (name deleted) 
handles people day-to-day." This statement may serve 
to explain why the supportive dimension of 
organizational climate at School B was the weakest of 
the four schools in the study. 
Principal Restrictive Behavior 
The third dimension of principal behavior that the 
OCDQ-RE addresses is restrictive behavior. Principals 
who exhibit restrictive behavior have a high degree of 
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concern for following established policies and 
procedures. Administrative detail is of great concern 
to them. Principals who are restrictive seldom permit 
or encourage teacher participation in decision making 
and, as a consequence, stifle creativity in approaching 
ways to solve school problems. In conclusion, 
principals who display restrictive behavior, frequently 
burden other members of the school staff with a number 
of non-teaching related activities, such as committee 
responsibilites and burdensome paperwork. 
In an effort to detect any differences in 
restrictive behavior on the part of merit pay and 
non-merit pay principals, the sixth research question 
in this study asked, "Are merit pay principals more 
restrictive than non-merit pay principals?" The 
structure of the Organizational Climate Description 
Questionnaire - RE is such that it consists of five 
items that deal with assessing restrictive principal 
behavior. Those items on the OCDQ-RE that deal with 
restrictve principal behavior are shown in Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
RESTRICTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS OF PRINCIPAL 
BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
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11 Routine duties interfere with the job of 
teaching. 
18 Teachers have too many committee 
requirements. 
25 Administrative paperwork is burdensome at 
this school. 
31* Clerical support reduces teachers' 
paperwork. 
36 Teachers are burdened with paperwork. 
*scored negatively 
The composite mean scores for both the merit pay 
and non-merit pay schools were computed for restrictive 
principal behavior. The two merit pay schools in the 
study had a composite mean score of 12.54. The 
non-merit pay schools mean composite was 12.48. The 
composite mean scores indicate a slightly stronger 
restrictive behavior property for the two merit pay 
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schools. Table 16 shows the composite mean scores for 
both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools that 
participated in this study. 
TABLE 16 
RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
12.54 
12.48 
*Sum = total of individual responses 
SUM* 
463.61 
388.66 
Individual school scores for restrictive behavior 
of principals were also computed and are illustrated in 
Table 17. 
TABLE 17 
RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL MEAN 
School A (Merit Pay) 11.23** 
School B (Merit Pay) 13.31** 
School C (Non-Merit Pay) 10.56** 
School D (Non-merit Pay) 14.53** 
RESPONSES 
13 
22 
16 
15 
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TABLE 17 -- CONTINUED 
Total 12.52 66 
**Statistically significant 
The composite mean scores for individual schools 
illustrate that the most restrictive principal behavior 
was evident in School D, a non-merit pay school. The 
composite mean score for that school was 14.53. School 
B, a merit pay school, had the second strongest 
restrictive score, 13.31. A composite restrictive 
score of 11.23 was produced by School A, a merit pay 
school, the third strongest score. The lowest level of 
restrictive behavior was found to exist at School D 
whose mean score on the restrictive subtest was 10.56. 
School D is a non-merit pay school. 
Statistical analysis of the data was performed by 
school types, merit pay vis-a-vis non-merit pay schools 
to compare mean scores. When grouped, the merit pay 
teachers produced a mean score of 12.54. The non-merit 
pay teachers produced a mean score of 12.48. Analysis 
of the data for the two groups revealed no significant 
differences. When schools were compared for 
differences between one another for restrictive 
principal behavior, there was found to be a 
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statistically significant difference in scores between 
School A and School B, both merit pay schools. Also,·a 
significant difference was found to exist between 
School A and School D. School D a non-merit pay school 
having a higher restrictive property for principal 
behavior. A significant difference was also found to 
exist between School B and School c. Finally, the 
scores of the two non-merit pay schools also differed 
significantly. 
When further analysis was performed on the data, a 
significant difference beyond the .OS level of 
acceptance established for this study for restrictive 
principal behavior, was found to exist among teachers 
who were members of unions, as opposed to their 
non-union counterparts. Teachers having union 
affiliation produced a composite mean score of 12.90 
compared with a score of 10.92 for non-union members. 
As stated, the stronger perceived restrictive property 
held by the union teachers differed significantly from 
their non-union counterparts. However, when comparing 
differences based upon varying levels of teaching 
experience, 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 
years and 20 plus years of experience, no significant 
differences were noted. 
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Teacher Disengagement 
Teachers who display disengaged behavior are thos·e 
who take little personal interest in their school, or 
in the personal lives of their colleagues. Disengaged 
teachers also display little professional interest. 
Such teachers merely mark time on the job and lend 
little support to effective team building. 
Consequently, they lack common goal orientation and 
have a negative effect upon their colleagues and the 
school. Hoy's Organizational Climate Description 
_Questionnaire-RE contains four items designed to assess 
the level of disengagement within a school organization 
and addresses the seventh research question, "Are merit 
pay teachers more disengaged than non-merit pay 
teachers?" The four items designed to assess the 
disengagement dimension of faculty behavior are 
illustrated in Table 18. 
TABLE 18 
DISENGAGED ITEMS OF TEACHER BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
3 Faculty meetings are useless. 
18 There is a minority group of teachers who 
always oppose the majority. 
TABLE 18 -- CONTINUED 
14 Teachers exert group pressure on non-
conforming faculty members. 
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21 Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty 
meetings. 
Composite mean scores for disengaged teacher 
behavior were computed by school types and are 
illustrated in Table 19. 
TABLE 19 
COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
7.71** 
6.73** 
*Sum = total of individual responses 
**Statistically significant 
SUM* 
269.99 
208.86 
Disengaged behavior on the part of faculty members 
at the merit pay schools is stronger than at the 
non-merit pay schools. As Table 19 illustrates, the 
merit pay school teachers produced a composite mean 
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score of 7.71, while their non-merit pay school 
counterparts produced a mean score of 6.73 on the 
disengaged subtest. Application of a t test to the 
data, revealed a significant difference between the two 
groups. 
In addition to computing scores by school types, 
individual school scores for faculty disengagement were 
also developed. The individual school scores are 
revealed in Table 20 and show that School B, a merit 
pay building, had the strongest disengagement score of 
7.95. 
TABLE 20 
COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL MEAN RESPONSES 
School A (Merit Pay) 7.30 13 
School B (Merit Pay) 7.95** 22 
School c (Non-Merit Pay) 5.75** 16 
School D (Non-Merit Pay) 7.73** 15 
Total 7.24 66 
**Statistically significant 
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Although a merit pay school produced the highest 
composite score of the four schools in the study, a 
non-merit pay school, School D, produced the second 
highest score for disengagement (7.73), just slightly 
stronger than the 7.30 composite score produced by 
School A, a merit pay school. The weakest score, or 
the most engaged faculty was found to exist in School 
C, a non-merit pay school, whose composite score was 
5.75. 
Through the utilization of a t test the composite 
scores of each school were compared for differences 
between individual schools. A level of significance 
beyond the .OS level was found to exist between School 
B, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay 
school, when comparing their scores. Likewise, a 
significant difference existed between the two 
non-merit pay schools for faculty disengagement. No 
significant differences in disengagement were detected 
however, between non-union teachers and their fellow 
teachers who were affiliated with either the National 
Education Association or the American Federation of 
Teachers. Union faculty in the study produced a 
disengagement mean score of 7.39. The thirteen 
non-union teachers who took part in the study had a 
composite mean score of 6.61. A t test applied to this 
data revealed no significant differences between the 
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two groups. When mean scores for disengagement were 
compared between teachers at various levels of teaching 
experience, some significance was detected in analysis 
of the data. Teachers with 0-5 years experience 
produced a mean score of 8.44 when compared to teachers 
with 11-15 years experience whose mean was 6.44, a 
significant difference between the scores of the two 
groups was noted. Analysis of the data between all 
other strata of teaching experience did not yield any 
significant differences between teachers at all other 
levels of experience analyzed in this study. 
Intimacy 
When teachers get to know one another well and 
socialize with each other, both in and out of the work 
place, their level of intimate behavior within the 
organization increases and has a corresponding impact 
on the organizational climate of the school. In many 
instances, teachers become personal friends. When 
intimate behavior on the part of teachers permeates the 
organizational climate of a school, the result can be 
the development of a social support network among 
faculty members. The eighth and final question asks, 
"Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit more 
intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay schools?" 
The Organizational Climate Description 
Questionnaire-RE contains seven items dealing with the 
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social interactions and relationships that teachers in 
a school may have with one another. Those items that· 
appear in the OCDQ-RE that play a role in the 
assessment of intimate behavior of teachers are shown 
in Table 21. 
TABLE 21 
INTIMATE ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE 
ITEM NUMBER ITEM 
2 Teachers' closest friends are other 
faculty members at this school. 
7 Teachers invite other faculty members to 
visit them at home. 
13 Teachers know the family background of 
other faculty members. 
20 Teachers have fun socializing together 
during school time. 
27 Teachers have parties for each other. 
33 Teachers socialize with each other on a 
regular basis. 
38 Teachers provide strong social support for 
colleagues. 
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Computation of mean scores by school types 
revealed that the two merit pay schools had stronger 
levels of intimate behavior than did the non-merit pay 
schools. The composite scores by school type for 
intimate teacher behavior are shown in Table 22. 
TABLE 22 
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE 
SCHOOL TYPE 
MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS 
MEAN 
20.31** 
17.71** 
*Sum = total of individual responses 
**Statistically significant 
SUM* 
710.99 
549.19 
The 20.31 composite score produced by the merit 
pay faculty members, indicates that the overall social, 
intimacy network operating in those schools was 
stronger than that in the two non-merit pay schools 
whose mean score on the intimate behavior subtest was 
17.71. When computed by individual schools, the 
results were consistent with those produced by school 
types. Table 23 shows the composite intimate scores 
for each individual school in the study. 
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TABLE 23 
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL 
SCHOOL MEAN RESPONSES 
School A (Merit Pay) 20.69** 13 
School B (Merit Pay) 20.09** 22 
School c (Non-Merit Pay) 15.81** 16 
School D (Non-Merit Pay) 18.40** 15 
Total 18.78 66 
**Statistically significant 
The results of computing the individual school 
mean scores for intimate faculty behavior indicate that 
the merit pay schools had consistently higher, and thus 
stronger, intimate behavior. The results of this 
aspect of the study illustrate that with mean scores of 
20.69 and 20.09 respectively, Schools A and B had 
developed a stronger social support network for faculty 
members. School D, a non-merit pay school, produced a 
mean score of 18.40, while School C produced the 
weakest score for intimate behavior at 15.81. 
The data for intimate behavior by school type was 
statistically analyzed and revealed a significant 
difference between merit pay and non-merit pay schools. 
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In addition to analysis by school type, the data was 
analyzed by individual schools. The individual school· 
analysis revealed that a difference existed between 
School A, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit 
pay school, beyond the .OS level of acceptance for 
significance for intimate behavior. School A also 
differed significantly from School D. School B, the 
second merit pay school, differed significantly from 
School C a non-merit pay school. Finally, the scores 
of the two non-merit pay schools differed from one 
another at a level of significance beyond the .OS level 
of acceptance for intimate behavior. 
TABLE 24 
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY EXPERIENCE 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
0- s 
6-10 
11-lS 
16-20 
20+ 
MEAN 
18.88 
18.72 
19.0S 
16.66 
20.62 
Statistical analysis was also performed on the 
data by years of teaching experience at various 
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stratas. When comparing teachers with varying levels 
of experience, no significant differences at or below 
the .05 level could be found. Teachers having 0-5 
years teaching experience had a composite mean score 
for intimacy of 18.88. While those with 6-10 years 
experience produced a mean score of 18.72. More 
experienced teachers with 11-15 years of service had an 
intimacy score of 19.05; those with 16-20 years in the 
classroom produced a mean of 16.66, and those with more 
than twenty years experience had a mean score of 20.62. 
Although those with the most experience produced the 
highest intimacy property no significant differences 
between any of the groups was noted at or below the .05 
level of significance. Finally, when the data was 
analyzed by union and non-union affiliation, no 
significant differences in the level of intimate 
behavior could be found between teachers of either 
group. The fifty-three teachers affiliated with a 
teacher's union produced an intimate composite mean 
score of 19.22. Their non-union counterparts had a 
mean score of 17.00. 
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Summary 
The data examined in this chapter reveals that fo·r 
the most part the organizational climates of merit pay 
and non-merit pay schools are similar in nature. Both 
the openness indices for faculty relations and 
principal behavior do not vary greatly. When viewed 
from an individual school perspective, greater variance 
in the scores was detected between one of the two merit 
pay schools in the study (School B), and the other 
three schools that included another merit pay facility. 
When examining the data elicited by the six 
subtests of organizational climate, once again similar 
patterns emerge. Some differences in the level of 
collegial behavior between teachers with varying levels 
of classroom experience existed. Those teachers with 
0-5 years teaching experience had mean score of 23.22. 
Their more experienced colleagues with twenty plus 
years of experience had a composite mean score of 
27.50. The difference between the two groups was found 
to be significant. However, no differences were found 
between types of schools. Nor could any differences be 
found between teachers based upon union affiliation. 
The data for directive principal behavior revealed 
a significant difference between the scores of the 
merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Significant 
differences were also found in the subtest scores for 
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restrictive principal behavior between the individual 
schools in this study. 
Analysis of the data for supportive behavior 
illustrated stronger supportive behavior at the 
non-merit pay schools. Some consistency of the school 
type data (merit pay schools vis-a-vis non-merit pay 
schools), was found when the schools were viewed 
individually. Both merit pay schools maintained 
significantly lower scores on the supportive subtest 
than did School C, a non-merit pay school. 
When the data for restrictive principal behavior 
was examined by school type, no difference was found to 
exist in the perception of merit pay teachers and their 
non-merit pay counterparts. Further analysis of that 
same data revealed that some differences existed 
between individual schools participating in the study. 
Also, a difference in the level of disengagement 
beyond the .05 level of acceptance was found to exist 
between merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Further 
analysis also revealed that a difference in 
disengagement was also present between Schools B and C 
and between teachers with 0-5 years teaching experience 
and their counterparts with 11-15 years of experience 
in the classroom. 
Finally, when the data for intimate faculty 
behavior was analyzed a difference did exist between 
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the merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Significant 
differences were also detected between the two merit 
pay schools and School C, but no differences were 
detected between the merit pay schools and School D in 
their intimacy scores. Additionally, the scores for 
both non-merit pay schools differed significantly. No 
differences in the scores were found to exist when 
comparing scores of groups for union and non-union 
affliation, or at the different strata of teaching 
experience. 
TABLE 25 
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY UNION MEMBERSHIP 
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
UNION MEMBERS 
NON-UNION MEMBERS 
MEAN 
19.22 
17.00 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed in Chapters I and II, since the 
publication of a number of national reports calling for 
reforms in education, increased attention has been 
given to merit pay plans for teachers. In response to 
those calls for the institution of incentive-based pay 
programs a number of organizations, including the 
country's largest teachers union, have voiced 
opposition to such plans. The result has been the 
publication of various elements in the literature that 
detail reasons for opposition to such plans that 
include, among other things, the development of a 
competitive atmosphere among teachers that is generally 
viewed as not having a positive impact on school 
climate. 
The philosophy behind merit pay is that it 
serves as a method for rewarding better teachers. 
Teachers who perform better than others should be paid 
more money. Because such conditions exist in merit pay 
schools, it would follow that concern would develop 
over the organizational climate that exists in merit 
pay schools as opposed to non-merit pay schools. 
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Organizational climate may be seen as the relationships 
that teachers experience with their colleagues and 
principals. These relationships help to form the 
personality that a school assumes and sets the 
educational tone in the school. 
In view of the concerns cited above, this study 
had as its primary purpose to discern whether or not 
any differences existed between the organizational 
climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools. In 
order to determine if such differences existed the 
following research questions were considered in the 
study: 
1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay 
schools less open than that of non-merit pay schools? 
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less 
open than principals in non-merit pay schools? 
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more 
collegial than merit pay school teachers? 
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more 
directive? 
5. Are principals in merit pay school less 
supportive? 
6. Are merit pay school principals more 
restrictive than non-merit pay school principals? 
7. Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than 
non-merit pay school teachers? 
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8. Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit 
more intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay 
schools? 
The population of this study consisted of 
sixty-six teachers of four elementary schools from four 
different elementary school districts in Du Page 
County, Illinois. In order to elicit data necessary to 
the completion of this study, all teachers in each of 
the four schools were asked to complete Wayne K. Hoy's, 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE and 
a short demographic data sheet. Scores for openness of 
faculty and principal behavior were computed and scores 
for each of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE were also 
computed. The data was further analyzed and t tests 
were run to determine significant differences between 
groups. A significance level of .OS was determined to 
be appropriate for significance. 
Findings 
The research questions in this study fall into 
two distinct categories. The first category deals with 
faculty behavior and deals with those elements of 
organizational climate attributable to faculty 
interactions. The first, third, seventh, and eighth 
research questions focus on faculty aspects of 
organizational climate. 
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The second category of research questions deals 
with elements of organizational climate that may be 
attributable to principal behavior. The second, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth research questions focus on 
the principal behavior aspect of organizational 
climate. The findings in this study will be reported 
based upon the category of each type of research 
question. 
Faculty Relations 
1. The openness index for faculty relations 
indicated that as a group the merit pay schools had a 
slightly more open climate than did the non-merit pay 
schools. 
2. When viewed as individual schools, the 
results were consistent with the first finding, the two 
merit schools maintained slightly more open 
organizational climates for faculty relations. 
3. On the collegial dimension of organizational 
climate the mean scores between types of schools varied 
only slightly, with the merit pay schools exhibiting a 
slightly stronger collegial dimension. 
4. When mean scores for individual schools were 
computed, the results were not totally consistent with 
the third finding. One merit pay school had the 
strongest collegial score, while the other merit pay 
school ranked third. The two non-merit pay schools 
ranked second and fourth respectively in collegial 
strength. 
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5. No significant differences between school 
types or individual schools were found on the collegial 
dimension. 
6. There were, however, significant differences 
between teachers with 0-5 years experience and those 
with 20 or more years experience for the collegial 
properties: the more senior teachers producing the 
stronger score. 
7. On the subtest for disengagement, the 
non-merit pay schools had significantly more engaged 
faculty members than did the merit pay schools. 
8. As individual schools, the results were not 
quite consistent with the school type results. The 
most disengaged faculty was found in one of the merit 
pay schools. However, a non-merit pay school produced 
the second strongest disengaged score (7.733 as opposed 
to 7.3077 for the second merit pay school in the 
study). The most engaged faculty was found in one of 
the merit pay schools. 
9. A significant difference was found between 
the two non-merit pay schools: School C having the most 
engaged faculty. 
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10. Significance was also found between School 
B, a merit pay school, and School c. 
11. Teachers with 11-15 years experience were 
found to be more engaged than those with 0-5 years 
experience at a level of significance beyond the 
established level of .05. 
12. The merit pay schools as a group were found 
to have a significantly stronger intimate behavior 
property than did the non-merit pay schools. When 
broken down by individual schools, the results for 
intimate behavior were consistent. Both merit pay 
schools maintained higher scores for the intimate 
behavior subtest. Significant differences were found 
between School A and both of the non-merit pay schools. 
School B, a merit pay school, also differed 
significantly from School c. 
13. The scores between the two non-merit pay 
schools had a significant difference beyond the 
acceptance level of .05. The School C faculty having 
the lower intimate behavior score. 
Principal Behavior 
1. The openness indices for principal behavior 
by school types showed that the non-merit pay 
principals were more open. 
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2. The results in the first finding for 
principal behavior were not consistent when the schools 
were viewed individually. The most open principal 
behavior was found at a non-merit pay school, the least 
open principal behavior was found at a merit pay 
school. However, a merit pay school did have the 
second highest openness score for principal behavior. 
3. The stronger directive scores were found in 
the merit pay schools when grouped by school types. 
4. As individual schools, a merit pay school 
had the most directive score, a non-merit pay school 
the lowest. However, a non-merit pay school had the 
second strongest score and a merit pay school had the 
second lowest directive principal behavior. 
S. Significant differences existed between the 
two merit pay schools beyond the .OS level of 
acceptance on the directive subtest. 
6. Also on the directive subtest, a significant 
difference was present between the School C score and 
the scores produced by both merit pay schools. 
7. A significant difference was also noted 
between Schools B and D. School B having a higher 
directive score. 
8. The stronger supportive properties were 
observed in the non-merit pay schools when schools were 
grouped by type, significant beyond the .OS level. 
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9. As individual schools the findings for 
supportive behavior were consistent. Both non-merit 
pay schools maintained stronger scores for the 
supportive dimension. Significance beyond the .05 
acceptance level was found between the two merit pay 
schools, between Schools A and C, B and C, and between 
Schools B and D. 
10. Teachers with 20 plus years experience 
perceived more supportive principal behavior than their 
colleagues with 0-5 years experience. The difference 
in scores between the two groups was significant. 
However, teachers with 11-15 years experience had a 
stronger supportive property differing significantly 
with their colleagues with 16-20 years experience. 
11. There were no significant differences found 
between union and non-union teachers on the supportive 
subtest. 
12. The scores for restrictive behavior for 
principals by school types were strongest at the merit 
pay schools when schools were grouped. 
13. The results of the previous finding are not 
consistent when individual school scores are observed. 
Both the strongest and weakest scores for restrictive 
behavior were found at the non-merit pay schools. 
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14. There were no significant differences 
between the scores by school types on the restrictive · 
subtest. 
lS. A level of significance beyond the .OS 
level of acceptance for significance existed between 
the two merit pay schools. 
16. Schools A and D differed significantly from 
one another. 
17. The merit pay school scores differed 
significantly on the restrictive behavior subtest. 
18. A significant difference was found to exist 
between Schools B and C on the restrictive subtest: 
School C, a non-merit pay school, having the less 
restrictive score. 
19. There was a significant difference in the 
restrictive scores beyond the .OS level between union 
and non-union members. Union members produced the 
stronger score for the property. 
Conclusions 
This study provides information that may have 
implications for those school boards and those 
administrators who may consider merit pay a viable 
salary system for implementation in a school district. 
Some of the conclusions that may be drawn from this 
study based upon data gathering and analysis are: 
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1. A review of the literature suggests that 
there are differing opinions as to the impact of merit 
pay plans on teacher interaction, that such systems 
create a more competitive school environment and they 
may create dissatisfaction. Because of the potential 
for impact on a school's organizational climate, school 
district decision makers may view this study as 
providing inferences that may be helpful in guiding 
decisions about merit pay. 
2. The openness indices for both faculty 
relations and principal behavior did not differ greatly 
between the merit pay and non-merit pay schools when 
the schools were grouped by type. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that merit pay programs have little 
relationship to the degree of openness in a school. 
While many other variables may impact organizational 
climate, apparently a merit pay program is not one of 
them. 
3. Based upon the scoring and assessment 
procedures for the Organizational Climate Description 
Questionnaire-RE there does not appear to be a great 
deal of difference in the strength of collegial 
relationships among faculty in merit pay and non-merit 
pay schools, although there are some differences 
between individual schools in this study. Again, it 
may be concluded that merit pay programs do not effect 
the collegial relationships that occur within the 
organizational climate of a school. 
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4. There are similar levels of engagement at 
both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Teachers 
at the non-merit pay schools had slightly stronger 
engaged climate. Although non-merit pay teachers had a 
slightly stronger engaged climate than their merit pay 
counterparts, no significant differences were noted 
between the two groups. It can be concluded therefore, 
that performance based pay systems have no effect upon 
the level of engagement between school faculty members. 
5. The merit pay schools had a consistently 
stronger intimate behavior property than did the 
non-merit pay schools. This was shown in the mean 
scores for school types as well as for individual 
schools. It may therefore be concluded that merit pay 
programs may play a role in establishing the level of 
intimacy in a school's organizational climate. 
6. By school types, merit pay teachers viewed 
their principals to be more directive than did 
non-merit pay teachers. It may be concluded, 
therefore, that teachers in merit pay schools preceive 
their principals to be more directive than teachers in 
non-merit pay schools. 
7. Based upon scores for the supportive subtest 
for OCDQ-RE supportive principal behavior is stronger 
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in the non-merit pay schools than in the non-merit pay 
schools. The data for school types on the supportive· 
subtests was consistent with the data produced by 
individual schools~ the non-merit pay schools both 
maintained stronger supportive principal dimensions. 
It can therefore be concluded that merit pay systems 
may act as a variable in establishing the perceived 
level of principal support that teachers in merit pay 
schools may hold. 
8. It may be inferred that because merit pay 
teachers perceive their principals to be more 
restrictive and less supportive than non-merit pay 
teachers, a higher level of intimacy within the 
organizational climate may develop due to the perceived 
higher restrictiveness and lower supportiveness from 
principals. 
9. For the restrictive dimension, union 
teachers produced a significantly higher score than 
their non-union counterparts. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that teachers who are affiliated with unions 
view their principals to be more restrictive. 
Consequently, union membership may be a variable that 
effects restrictiveness. 
10. Teachers with 11-15 years experience are 
more engaged than faculty with 0-5 years experience. 
It may therefore be concluded that faculty members in 
the middle range of experience are more school 
oriented. 
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11. Teachers with 20 plus years experience 
possess a stronger collegial property than teachers 
with 0-5 years experience. Therefore, the conclusion 
may be drawn that schools with more experienced faculty 
will have higher levels of staff collegiality. 
12. Faculty members with 20 plus years 
experience perceive stronger principal support than 
teachers with 0-5 years experience. It can therefore 
be concluded from the data accumulated in this study 
that teaching experience is a variable that plays a 
role in the organizational climate of school. Those 
teachers with 20 plus years of experience had 
consistently higher scores in the collegial, as well 
as, principal supportive dimensions. 
13. Teachers having taught 11-15 years produced 
a stronger supportive score than did teachers with 
16-20 years experience. 
14. Those teachers with more than 20 years 
experience indicated more supportive behavior by 
principals than those with 16-20 years experience. 
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Recommendations 
A review of the literature and the results of 
this study indicate that merit pay may continue to be a 
controversial subject. As efforts are made to increase 
the accountability of schools and improve the quality 
of instruction in hopes of raising student achievement, 
it is inevitable that improved salary structures for 
teachers become part of the dialogue. For those who 
make decisions about teacher salaries, merit pay may be 
seen as an attractive alternative to reward good 
teachers and rid the system of poorer faculty, 
especially at a time when the level of funding schools, 
particularly in Illinois, is low. Based upon this 
investigation the following recommendations are made: 
1. A study similar to this investigation should 
be conducted on a wider basis. The focus of this study 
was narrowed to four schools in a suburban setting. 
The population was almost entirely female. A broader 
study, that would include teachers from rural as well 
as from larger metropolitan school districts would be 
beneficial in helping to assess the organizational 
climate of schools throughout the state or nation as a 
whole. 
2. Prior to implementation of merit pay 
programs it is recommended that school district 
decision makers review the literature dealing with 
merit pay and organizational climate, and carefully 
consider the benefits as well as the costs of such 
programs. 
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3. Before making a decision to implement a 
merit pay program, school district decision makers may 
wish to consider assessment of the organizational 
climate of schools within the district. 
4. Further studies such as this investigation 
should be completed to determine the consistency of 
results and data with regard to the subtests of the 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE as 
well as in a high school setting using the 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RS 
(Revised Secondary). 
5. Because teacher evaluation, evaluative 
techniques and skills of evaluators determine the size 
of merit pay grants, a study should be conducted that 
deals with assessment of organizational climate, 
teacher evaluation procedures, and the skills 
principals possess as evaluators. Such information may 
prove beneficial in Illinois wherein school 
administrators must be recertified and trained in 
evaluation practices and techniques through the 
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state-mandated Administrator's Academy. This 
information may be helpful to administrators in 
assisting them in developing evaluative techniques and 
procedures that have a positive effect on 
organizational climate. Also, because teaching 
experience appears to be a variable that plays a role 
in organizational climate, administrators should have 
information about various evaluative procedures that 
may work best in various types of schools based upon 
the make-up of the school's faculty. 
6. A study similar to this research, should be 
conducted comparing the organizational climate of both 
merit pay and non-merit pay schools with student 
achievement, the end product of the process of 
schooling. 
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APPENDIX A 
6839 Park Lane 
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463 
August 30, 1987 
Professor Wayne K. Hoy 
Graduate School of Education 
Rutgers University 
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903 
Dear Professor Hoy: 
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As Part of my research project for my doctoral 
dissertation at Loyola University of Chicago, I would 
like to administer the Organizational Climate 
Description Questionnaire-RE to groups of elementary 
school teachers in Illinois. The focus of my research 
will deal with school climate in merit pay and 
non-merit pay Illinois elementary schools. Please 
forward to me information relative to securing copies 
of the OCDQ-RE as well as scoring information and all 
other pertinent data regarding the Questionnaire. 
Your prompt response to this request is greatly 
appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Bernard J. Jumbeck 
THE STATE UNIVERSllY OF NEW JERSEY 
RUTGERS 134 
Graduate School of Education· 10 Seminary Place· New Brunswick· New Jersey 08903 
Mr. Bernard J. Jumbeck 
6839 Park Lane 
Palos Heights, ILLINOIS 60463 
Dear Mr. Jumbeck: 
September 4, 1987 
You have my permission to use the 0~-RE in your research. I have 
enclosed an article on the OC~-RE, a copy of the 0~-RE and a copy of 
the scoring instrument. 
The only request I make of you is that you reference the article in any 
manuscript or publication which you write, and send me a copy of the 
results of the research. 
Wayne K. Hoy 
Professor 
WKH:csh 
Encl: 
_,,.-·"") 
/ 
~7,· 
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To Score the OCDQ-RE 
1. Group the items according to the six subtests (See 
enclosure). 
2. RO=l S0=2 00=3 V0=4 Each item (except negative 
items*) should be scored according to the numerical 
code. The items with an * are scored in reverse--
R0=4 S0=3 00=2 VO=l. For the subjects in each 
school, the scores for each item are to be averaged 
across individuals (an average item school score is 
created): hence, each school will have a mean score 
for each of the items of the OCDQ-RE. Then the 
mean scores for each of the subtests should be 
summed to produce the school score on each of the 
subtests. NOTE: This procedure is used because 
the appropriate unit of analysis is the school, not 
the individual. 
3. The higher the score on each dimension, the 
stronger that property for the school. 
4. TWO openess indices can be created for each 
school as follows: 
a.) Standardize the school scores for each 
subtest. I suggest you make the mean 50 and the 
standard deviation 10. 
b.) Openess Index for faculty relations= [C+I-D] 
WHERE C = the standardized collegial subtest score, 
I= the standardized intimate score, and D is the 
standardized disengaged score. 
c.) Openness Index for principal 
behavior=[S-D-R] WHERE S= the standardized 
supportive subtest score, D is the standardized 
directive score, and S is the standardized 
restrictive score. 
5. Norms have not been established;, hence, 
comparisons should be made within your sample. 
The Six Dimensions of the OCDQ-RE 
and Items that Compose the Six Subtests 
Teacher Behavior: Collegial 
Collegial behavior is indicated by supportive, 
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professional relationships among staff. Teachers are 
proud of their school, enjoy working with their 
colleagues, and feel a sense of accomplishment and 
fulfillment in their jobs. They exhibit energy, 
enthusiasm, and positiveness. 
Collegial Items 
1. The teachers accomplish their work with vim, 
vigor and pleasure. 
* 6. Teachers leave school immediately after school 
is over. 
12. Most of the teachers here accept the faults of 
their colleagues. 
19. Teachers help and support each other. 
26. Teachers are proud of their school. 
32. New teachers are readily accepted by their 
colleagues. 
* 37. Teachers socialize together in small, select 
groups. 
40. Teachers respect the professional competence of 
their colleagues. 
* scored negatively 
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Teacher Behavior: Intimate 
Intimate behavior reflects a pervasive social support 
network among staff. Teachers have gotten to know one 
another well enough to be personal friends, and they 
socialize regularly both in and out of the working 
environment. 
Intimate Items 
2. Teachers' closest friends are other faculty 
members at this school. 
7. Teachers invite other faculty members to visit 
them at home. 
13. Teachers know the family background of other 
faculty members. 
20. Teachers have fun socializing together during 
school time. 
27. Teachers have parties for each other. 
33. Teachers socialize with each other on a regular 
basis. 
38. Teachers provide strong social support for 
colleagues. 
Teacher Behavior: Disengaged 
Disengaged behavior is exhibited by teachers who have 
no personal stake in the school, their colleagues, or 
their profession. They are simply putting in their 
time and are non-productive in group efforts or 
team-building: they have no common goal orientation. 
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Their behavior is negative and critical toward 
colleagues and the organization. 
Disengaged Items 
3. Faculty meetings are useless. 
18. There is a minority group of teachers who always 
oppose the majority. 
14. Teachers exert group pressure on non-conforming 
faculty members. 
21. Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty 
meetings. 
Principal Behavior: Supportive 
Supportive behavior by the principal is reflected in 
his/her genuine rapport with staff. Supportive 
principals respect the professional competence of their 
staff and also try to exhibit a personal interest in 
each teacher. They enjoy working with teachers to set 
goals and solve problems, and they are willing to 
accept teachers suggestions and feedback. Praise is 
given genuinely and frequently, and criticism is 
handled constructively. 
Supportive Items 
4. The principal goes out of his/her way to help 
teachers. 
9. The principal uses constructive criticism. 
15. The principal explains his/her reasons for 
criticism to teachers. 
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16. The principal listens to and accepts teachers' 
suggestions. 
22. The principal looks out for the personal 
welfare of teachers. 
23. The principal treats teachers as equals. 
28. The principal compliments teachers. 
29. The principal is easy to understand. 
42. The principal goes out of his/her way to show 
appreciation to teachers. 
Principal Behavior: Directive 
Directive behavior is indicated by principals who are 
rigid and keep a distance between employer and 
employee. Such principals need to maintain constant 
control over all teacher and school activities, down to 
the smallest details. Directive principals are 
monitors and autocrats, who give no consideration to 
interpersonal relationships. 
Directive Items 
5. The principal rules with an iron fist. 
10. The principal checks the sign-in sheet every 
morning. 
17. The principal schedules the work for the 
teachers. 
24. The principal corrects teachers' mistakes. 
30. The principal closely checks classroom (teacher) 
activities. 
34. The principal supervises teachers closely. 
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35. The principal checks lesson plans. 
39. The principal is autocratic. 
41. ThE~ principal monitors everything teachers do. 
Principal Behavior: Restrictive 
Restrictive behavior is exhibited by principals who 
discourage interaction and productivity because of 
their overwhelming concern for strict adherence to 
policies, procedures and administrative detail. 
Restrictive principals leave no room for teacher input 
or creative approaches to school concerns, and they 
burden others with non-educative activities. 
Restrictive Items 
11. Routine duties interfere with the job of 
teaching. 
18. Teachers have too many committeee requirements. 
25. Administrative paperwork is burdensome at this 
school. 
* 31. Clerical support reduces teachers' paperwork. 
36. Teachers are burdened with busywork. 
*scored negatively 
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6839 Park Lane 
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463 
May 3, 1988 
Dear Teacher: 
I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago 
working on my doctoral dissertation. The study deals 
with different aspects of organizational climate and 
various administrative practices in different types of 
schools. 
Your assistance is requested in assessing the 
organizational climate of your school. The 
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - R E, 
developed by Professor Wayne K. Hoy, has been selected 
as the assessment tool. Please respond to the 
Questionnaire and return it to your school principal 
using the enclosed envelope by Friday, May 13. 
In addition to the O C D Q - R E, please complete the 
short demographic data sheet which is also included in 
this packet. The information gleaned from that data 
will assist me in developing a school profile for the 
0 C D Q - R E responses. All information will be kept 
strictly confidential and will be utilized for academic 
and research purposes only. 
Thank you for your kind assistance and attention to my 
request. 
Sincerely, 
Bernard J. Jumbeck 
0 C D Q - R E 
DIRECTIONS: The following statements are about your 
school. Please indicate the extent to which each 
statement characterizes your school by circling the 
appropriate response. 
RO= RARELY OCCURS: SO= SOMETIMES OCCURS: O= OFTEN 
OCCURS: VF= VERY FREQUENTLY OCCURS 
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1. The teachers accomplish their work 
with vim, vigor and pleasure. ----- RO SO 0 VF 
2. Teachers' closest friends are other 
faculty members at this school. ---
3. Faculty meetings are useless -----
4. The principal goes out of his/her 
RO SO 0 VF 
RO SO 0 VF 
way to help teachers. ------------- RO SO O VF 
5. The principal rules with an iron 
fist. --------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
6. Teachers leave school immediately 
after school is over. ------------- RO SO O VF 
7. Teachers invite other faculty 
members to visit them at home. RO SO O VF 
8. There is a minority group of 
teachers who always oppose 
the majority. --------------------- RO SO o VF 
9. The principal uses constructive 
criticism. ------------------------ RO SO 0 VF 
10. The principal checks the sign-in 
sheet every morning. --------------- RO SO o VF 
11. Routine duties interfere with the 
job of teaching. ------------------ RO SO O VF 
12. Most of the teachers here accept 
the faults of their colleagues. RO so o VF 
13. Teachers know the family back-
ground of other faculty members. RO SO O VF 
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14. Teachers exert group pressure on 
non-conforming faculty members. RO SO O VF 
15. The principal explains his/her 
reasons for criticism to teachers.-- RO SO O VF 
16. The principal listens to and 
accepts teachers' suggestions. ----- RO SO 0 VF 
17. The principal schedules the 
work for the teachers. ------------ RO SO 0 VF 
18. Teachers have too many committee 
requirements. --------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
19. Teachers help and support each 
other. ---------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
20. Teachers have fun socializing 
together during school time. ------- RO SO O VF 
21. Teachers ramble when they talk 
at faculty meetings. -------------- RO SO 0 VF 
22. The principal looks out for the 
personal welfare of teachers. ------ RO SO O VF 
23. The principal treats teachers as 
equals. --------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
24. The principal corrects teachers' 
mistakes. ------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
25. Administrative paperwork is 
burdensome at this school. -------- RO SO o VF 
26. Teachers are proud of their school. 
------------------------------------ RO SO 0 VF 
27. Teachers have parties for each other. 
----------------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
28. The principal compliments teachers. 
----------------------------------- RO SO 0 VF 
29. The principal is easy to understand. 
------------------------------------ RO SO 0 VF 
30. The principal closely checks 
classroom (teacher) activities. RO SO 0 VF 
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31. Clerical support reduces teachers' 
paperwork. ------------------------ RO so o VF 
32. New teachers are readily accepted 
colleagues. ----------------------- RO SO o VF 
33. Teachers socialize with each other 
on a regular basis. ---------------- RO SO O VF 
34. The principal supervises teachers 
closely. ------------------------- RO SO O VF 
35. The principal checks lesson plans. 
------------------------------------ RO SO 0 VF 
36. Teachers are burdened with busywork. 
------------------------------------ RO SO 0 VF 
37. Teachers socialize together in 
small, select groups. ------------- RO SO 0 VF 
38. Teachers provide strong social 
support for colleagues. ------------ RO SO o VF 
39. The principal is autocratic. ------ RO SO O VF 
40. Teachers respect the professional 
competence of their colleagues. RO SO O VF 
41. The principal monitors everything 
teachers do. ---------------------- RO SO O VF 
42. The principal goes out of his/her 
way to show appreciation to 
teachers. ------------------------- RO SO o VF 
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PLEASE SUPPY THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
A. How many years have you been a teacher? 
years 
B. How long have you worked in your current school 
system? 
years 
c. How long have you worked in your current position? 
years 
D. Are you affliliated with a local teacher 
association? 
yes no __ _ 
E. With what national teacher association is your 
local association affiliated? 
N.E.A. A.F.T. None 
---Other (please specify) 
-------------~ 
F. Are you tenured? Yes No 
G. 
---
What is your major area of 
Elementary education 
Mathematics ~-
Special Education 
Music 
Social Studies 
Other (please specifyr-
teaching specialization? 
Science 
Art 
Physical education~­
English 
__________________ 
H. What grade level(s) do you teach? 
----------~ 
I. What is your marital status? 
Married Single 
-~-Widowed Separated 
---
Divorced 
J. What is your sex? 
Male Female 
L. Degree Status (Bachelor's, Master's, Doctorate) 
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